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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The real cure for our environmental problems is to understand that our job is to salvage Mother Nature. We 
are facing a formidable enemy in this field. It is the hunters…and to convince them to leave their guns on the 
wall is going to be very difficult.1 
- Jacques Cousteau, Oceanographer 
 
The critical relationship between humans and the oceans is a timeless tradition where the 
reliance on each other is entirely one-sided. Vast amounts of coastal communities depend on the 
oceans as a primary source of protein for their diets and increasing trends of overfishing have 
threatened this important food source. The root of overfishing is largely facilitated through vessel 
overcapacity.2 Conversely, this overcapacity is a direct result of subsidizing efforts by the State 
and therefore arguably falls under State authority in this regard.3 Food-insecure countries, such as 
those found in West Africa are hit the hardest by heavily subsidized industrial fishing vessels 
from developed countries. Currently, “West Africa’s fish stocks are being depleted by industrial 
trawlers which comb the oceans to feed European and Asian markets.”4  
With subsidies creating an uneven playing field,5 many artisanal fisheries and developing 
countries find themselves powerless to massive fishing fleets effectively destroying global 
marine life at catastrophic levels.6  Just as fish stocks are being depleted in developing countries, 
the waters surrounding many industrialized countries have been feeling the effects for some time. 
A 2002 report published by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
revealed, “75% of the world’s commercially important marine fish stocks are either fully fished, 
																																																								
1 “Jacques Cousteau Quote.” Salvage Blue: 2016. Online: www.salvageblue.org/ (Accessed July 11, 2018). 
2 R.R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. The Law of the Sea. 3rd Edition. Huntington: Juris Publishing Inc. - Manchester 
University Press, 1999, p. 321.  
3 The FAO states, “Fisheries subsidies are government actions.” Online: www.fao.org/docrep/005 
/y4446e/y4446e0k.htm (Accessed June 13, 2018). 
4 Kieran Guilbert and Umberto Bacchi. FEATURE-All at sea: foreign fishing fleets drain West African waters. 
Reuters: May 8, 2017. Online: www.reuters.com/article/africa-fish-overfishing-idUSL8N1I43AH (Accessed July 12, 
2018). 
5 Anja von Moltke. Fisheries subsidies at the 11th WTO Ministerial in Buenos Aires. UN Environment: December 1, 
2017. Online: www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/blog-post/fisheries-subsidies-11th-wto-ministerial-buenos-
aires (Accessed July 12, 2018). 
6 Andrew Jacobs. China’s Appetite Pushes Fisheries to the Brink. New York Times: April 30, 2017. Online: 
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/chinas-appetite-pushes-fisheries-to-the-brink.html (Accessed June 3, 
2018).	
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overexploited, depleted or slowly recovering from a collapse.” 7  Despite the feeling of 
helplessness by artisanal fishermen and developing countries that things are only getting worse,8 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)9 may provide a legal 
avenue to address issues of harmful capacity enhancing subsidies that can cause overfishing, 
which inevitably runs contrary to international law. Under UNCLOS, coastal State jurisdiction 
and sovereign rights over resources must be weighed against the obligations afforded under Part 
XII, pertaining to protection and preservation of the marine environment. Perhaps, in this light, 
reframing subsidies contributing to overfishing as a Part XII dispute could entail meaningful 




 The objective of the thesis is to answer the question of whether harmful capacity 
enhancing fisheries subsidies can be addressed and sufficiently curbed under the current 
UNCLOS regime. To tackle this question, several sub-questions must also be sufficiently 
answered, namely: (1) Is there a causal link between subsidies and overfishing? (2) Does the 
regulation of fisheries under UNCLOS address subsidies? (3) Within a coastal State’s own EEZ, 
do the sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources supersede environmental 
obligations and duties? (4) What legal options exist under UNCLOS for mandatory dispute 
settlement procedures regarding subsidies contributing to overfishing within the EEZ? (5) Can a 
fisheries dispute be framed as a Part XII dispute? (6) What is the interaction between UNCLOS 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanisms? In order to answer these 
questions, UNCLOS will need to be adequately scrutinized, while international trade law, through 
the WTO, will be briefly examined in order to help determine the relationship between the two 
separate regimes, specifically with regards to dispute settlement.  
 The aforementioned issues are relevant for a number of reasons, namely that overfishing 
threatens the primary source of protein for the human race, and the balance to which our ocean 
																																																								
7 Wilfram Ken Swartz. "Global Maps of the Growth of Japanese Marine Fisheries and Fish Consumption." Resource 
Management and Environmental Studies, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2004, p.1. 
8 Saury prices expected to stay high as neighbors snub Japan-proposed catch quotas. Japan Times: August 7, 2017. 
Online: www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/07/business/saury-prices-look-stay-high-amid-overfishing-neighbors-
snub-japan-proposed-catch-quotas/#.W2bfHNgzbfZ (Accessed July 29, 2018).	
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 
1994). 1834 U.N.T.S. 397. 
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ecosystems hinge on is extremely delicate. Current negotiations within the WTO, as well as 
global acknowledgements in favor of the recent UN Development Goals have indicated there is 
consensus that the present issue must be resolved. However, the current state of our oceans 
indicates such change cannot come soon enough.  
 
1.2 Delimitation of Scope 
 
 The scope of the thesis is primarily limited to the international legal regime of fisheries 
within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). However, other maritime zones may be briefly 
touched upon to provide context. Under Article 57 of UNCLOS, “The [EEZ] shall not extend 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.”10 Although subsidies are an issue that occurs in all maritime zones, the basis for the 
limitation falls under the realization that 90% of all fishing occurs within the EEZ.11 Furthermore, 
“[f]ish stocks within EEZs are generally more commercially important than high sea stocks (with 
one study finding that <0.01 percent of the quantity and value of commercial fish taxa are 
obtained from catch taken exclusively in the high seas).”12 
 The WTO and international trade law will not be scrutinized in great detail, as it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Although some scholars, such as Young, may hint that the WTO 
sufficiently addresses subsidies already,13 the author of this thesis seeks to consider whether some 
elements of UNCLOS have been overlooked, or perhaps framed in a manner, which has 
insufficiently addressed the issue. Therefore, the main provisions to be analyzed will fall under 




The following thesis will use doctrinal research methodology to include statutes and 
cases. Primary focus shall be emphasized on Section 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
																																																								
10 Ibid, art. 57. 
11 Ellen Hey. "The Fisheries Provisions of the LOS Convention." Edited by E. Hey. Developments in International 
Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International), 1999, p. 27. 
12 Margaret A. Young. The 'Law of the Sea' Obligations Underpinning Fisheries Subsides Disciplines. Geneva: 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 2017, p. 7.  
13 Ibid, p. 5.	
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Treaties (VCLT) for the interpretation of treaties. The principle treaty that will be assessed is 
UNCLOS, which will be scrutinized “in accordance with the ordinary meaning […] in the light of 
its object and purpose.”14 Lastly, Article 38 of the Statute for the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) will be used as it stipulates “international conventions, […] international custom, […] 
general principles, […] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
[shall be applied] as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”15 This means that 
treaty interpretation shall come first, with jurisprudence and scholarly text to formulate the 
subsidiary means of strengthening any arguments. 
  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The structure of the following thesis subsequent to Chapter 1 will follow Chapters 2-8. 
Chapter 2 will provide a breakdown of the different types of subsidies, as well as an overview of 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals, which inspired this thesis. Finally, the question of 
whether there is a causal link between fisheries subsidies and overfishing will be answered.  
Chapter 3 will examine the fisheries regime under UNCLOS as it specifically applies to 
the EEZ. This will include an overview of coastal State sovereign rights and obligations. This 
chapter will lead to Chapter 4, which will scrutinize EEZ environmental obligations and the 
relationship between exploitation rights and environmental obligations as espoused under Article 
192 of UNCLOS. After a thorough breakdown of Article 192, the chapter will end with issues of 
due diligence/due regard.  
Chapter 5 will examine dispute settlement for EEZ fisheries within UNCLOS as well as 
whether subsidies breach UNCLOS. Details of “responsibility,” surplus rights and judicial 
jurisdiction will lead to the exclusion clause espoused under Article 297(3)(a). A possible bypass 
to this exclusion, as well as the inclusion of biodiversity in the exclusion will be addressed. 
Chapter 6 will argue the use of EIAs to compel research and information sharing for 
subsidy activities is necessary and may lead to more States adhering to their environmental 
obligations. Lastly, Chapter 7 will briefly touch upon the interaction with WTO law, ending with 
Chapter 8: Conclusion.   
																																																								
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, art. 31(1). 
15 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, art. 38(1). 
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Chapter 2: Fisheries Subsidies 
 
Estimates place fisheries subsidies as high as $35 billion worldwide, with the majority of 
those directly contributing to overcapacity and overfishing.16 As these subsidies are primarily 
occurring in the form of State-sponsorship, taxpayers17 are effectively paying for, “industrial 
boats to degrade the environment and to destroy the food security and livelihoods of vulnerable 
coastal communities.”18 Furthermore, subsidies do not benefit artisanal fisherman and instead 
benefit the largest vessels, which fosters inequality.19 Many large fishing vessels now have the 
capacity to stay at sea for months straight and harvest tremendous amounts of fish at one time. 
From this, many non-target species are caught accidentally and by the time the by-catch is 
released, they are already dead.20  
 Although fisheries subsidies primarily lead to capacity-enhancement for fishing fleets, not 
all subsidies are harmful. Some provide much needed money for monitoring and research, while 
some tread the line of harmful/beneficial. The following section will first address the three 
categories21 of subsidies,22 which are beneficial, ambiguous and capacity enhancing, respectively. 
These will be defined in order to explore their contribution/detriment to global fisheries. 
Secondly, UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.6 will be examined, which outlines current 
global efforts to address harmful subsidies. From these, it will lead to whether there exists a 
causal link between subsidies and overfishing. 
																																																								
16 Upcoming UN Ocean Conference expected to trigger a global solution to end harmful fisheries subsidies. 
UNCTAD: May 16, 2017. Online: unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1482 (Accessed July 
28, 2018). 
17 Next month's ocean conference eyes cutting $35 billion in fisheries subsidies – UN trade officials. UN News: May 
10, 2017. Online: news.un.org/en/story/2017/05/557002-next-months-ocean-conference-eyes-cutting-35-billion-
fisheries-subsidies-un#.Wm8gxktG3fY (Accessed July 28, 2018). 
18 To make fisheries more sustainable, trade community must end the pointless subsidies. UNCTAD: September 28, 
2016. Online: unctad.org/en/conferences/Ocean-Conference/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx? OriginalVersionID=1336  
19 Ibid. 
20 Gwynn Guilford. US fishermen throw back 20% of their catch—often after the fish are already injured or dead. 
Quartz: March 21, 2014. Online: qz.com/190379/us-fishermen-throw-back-20-of-their-catch-often-after-the-fish-are-
already-injured-or-dead/ (Accessed July 29, 2018). 
21 The FAO has a guide outlining 4 types of categories as: Direct financial transfers, Services and indirect financial 
transfers, Regulations, and Lack of intervention. These can be explored further at: www.fao.org/ tempref/docrep 
/fao/007/y5424e/y5424e00.pdf. The choice to use Sumaila’s categories was determined by overlap under the FAO 
Guide, as well as through other organizations. This is explained further by Sumaila (et al.) in “A bottom-up re-
estimation of global fisheries subsidies.” Journal of Bioeconomics 12: (August, 18, 2010), 201-225, at p. 203. 
22 Chen provides further discussion of the origins of defining subsidies in law in Chapter 1(II)(b) at: link.springer. 
com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-15693-9.pdf, providing further examples through the WTO, FAO and 
OECD, which he argues divide subsidies into 5, 6, and 5 categories respectively.		
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2.1 Categories of Subsidies 
2.1.1  What are Beneficial Subsidies? 
 
Beneficial subsidies are obviously important, if harmful subsidies are to be curtailed and 
fish stocks conservation is to be effectively promoted. These subsidies include, “fisheries 
management programs and services” and “fishery research and development.”23 Monitoring, 
surveillance, stock assessments, the establishment of Marine Protected Areas and scientific 
research are paramount.24 The European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 
who endorsed the UN classification over the FAO, indicates, “beneficial subsidies enhance the 
growth of fish stocks through conservation and the monitoring of catch rates through control and 
surveillance measures to achieve a biological and economic optimal use.”25 
 
2.1.2 What are Ambiguous Subsidies? 
 
 Ambiguous subsidies may either fall under the category of beneficial subsidies or 
capacity enhancing subsidies. Sometimes, programs may be intended as beneficial, yet ultimately 
end up having adverse effects. For example, the vessel buyback program that is intended to 
alleviate fishing pressure can lead instead to fleet modernization.26 Other examples include fisher 
assistance programs as well as rural fishers’ community development programs. Even in 
developing countries,27 these too have led to overcapacity instead of sustainable management. 
 
2.1.3 What are Capacity Enhancing Subsidies? 
 
Capacity enhancing subsidies are a massive detriment to the oceans and allow fisheries to 
fish for ‘cheaper’ and for much longer.28 Most capacity-enhancing subsidies (90%), which 
																																																								
23 Rashid Sumaila, Vicky Lam, Frédéric Le Manach, Wilf Swartz, Daniel Pauly. Global Fisheries Subsidies. Note, 
Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, European Parliament, Directorate-General For Internal Policies, 





28 Wilf Swartz. Ask an Expert: Why is the global fishing industry given $35 billion in subsidies each year? Neureus 
Program, The University of British Columbia: March 14, 2016. Online: nereusprogram.org/works/ ask-an-expert-
why-is-the-global-fishing-industry-given-35-billion-in-subsidies-each-year/ (Accessed July 30, 2018). 
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exacerbate overfishing, are exclusively provided to large-scale industrialized fisheries.29 This 
creates an uneven playing field for developing countries and artisanal fishers who may have to 
compete for shared or migratory fish stocks.  
 Capacity enhancing subsidies include tax exemption programs, foreign access 
agreements, boat constructions renewal and modernization programs, fishing port construction 
and renovation programs, fishery development projects and support services and fuel subsidies.30 
Of these, fuel subsidies represent the highest subsidized sub-category with 22% of the total.31 It 
should be noted that capacity enhancing subsidies play a different role for developing States as 
opposed to developed States. The crux of the issue lies in overcapacity, which in turn often leads 
to overexploitation. This practice unevenly benefits wealthier countries, which may require future 
agreements to consider “giving differential treatment to developing countries.”32 
 
2.2 UN Sustainable Development Goals 
 
The demand for unification in the sustainable use of the oceans and marine resources, as 
well as global conservation endeavours have garnered more traction recently with the 
“precipitous decline in fish stocks.”33 The United Nations Ocean Conference has, “re-energized 
[global] efforts,”34 and with that, many harmful capacity-enhancing fisheries subsidies have been 
addressed directly. Goal 14 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) highlights ocean 
conservation and sustainability with target 14.6 directly addressing harmful fisheries subsidies, 
which lead to overcapacity and overfishing.35 
For target 14.6, a four-point plan has been designed with support from member States, 
international organizations and NGOs. The “roadmap for [the] elimination of harmful fishing 
																																																								
29 Anna Schuhbauer, Ratana Chuenpagdee, William W.L. Cheung, Krista Greer, Rashid Sumaila. "How subsidies 
affect the economic viability of small-scale fisheries." Marine Policy 82 (August 2017): 114-121, p. 117. 
30 Supra, note 23. 
31 Ibid. 
32 At Ocean Conference, UN agencies commit to cutting harmful fishing subsidies. UN News: June 6, 2017. Online: 
news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/558942-ocean-conference-un-agencies-commit-cutting-harmful-fishing-
subsidies#.WTgZMBMrJBw (Accessed June 15, 2018). 
33 Press Release: UNCTAD14 sees 90 countries sign up to UN roadmap for elimination of harmful fishing subsidies. 
UNCTAD: July 20, 2016. Online: unctad.org/en/Pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersion ID=316 (Accessed July 
13, 2018). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Sustainable Development Goal 14. United Nations: 2017. Online: sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg14. 
(Accessed June 1, 2018). 
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subsidies”36 includes requirements from States to provide information on the subsidies they are 
providing to their fisheries sector, as well as a prohibition on all subsidies, which contribute to 
overfishing.37 The UN plan requires the introduction of new domestic policies which will deter 
other harmful subsidies, as well as providing special and differential treatment to developing 
countries, whose economies, as well as the hunger of many of its citizens might be negatively 
affected by a universal subsidies mechanism, intended to affect overfishing specifically.  
Ultimately, the United Nations Development Goals are a ‘soft-law’ mechanism, which 
relies entirely on domestic implementation, compliance and enforcement. “The voluntary 
commitments are meant to be taken individually or in partnership by Governments, the UN 
system, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and others, to support SDG14.”38 
Large support has already been pledged from many African nations, Caribbean nations, the 
Pacific Group (ACP), and more.39 However, time will tell whether/when the industrialized 
nations with the largest fishing fleets may or may not get on board. David Vivas of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) maintains that, “[Subsidies] create 
incentives to deplete resources faster than if there weren't the subsidies.”40 Yet, for many 
countries, powerful fishing lobbies and growing consumer tastes put tremendous pressure on 
governments for results. Many of these governments may likely not want to disclose information 
regarding their subsidies, as well as provide differential treatment for the developing nations of 
the world. However, it must be understood that different subsidies provide different effects, and 
not all are harmful. Furthermore, the question of whether or not a causal link exists between 
fisheries subsidies and overfishing must first be adequately examined before moving forward. 
 
2.3 Is There a Casual Link Between Fisheries Subsidies and Overfishing? 
 
 The 1993 FAO study, Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change, 
was “the first to suggest a causal relation between subsidies and declining [fish] stocks.”41 
However, based on data from 2003-04 Chen maintains, “the FAO have found it difficult to prove 
																																																								
36 Supra, note 32. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Supra, note 17. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Andrew Rubin, Eric Bilsky, (et al.). Paths to Fisheries Subsidies Reform: Creating sustainable fisheries through 
trade and economics. Washington, DC: Oceana, 2015, p. 134. 
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the relationship that subsidies cause overcapacity and that overcapacity causes overfishing.”42 
One possible reason for this could be lack of access to State data regarding its EEZ fisheries.  
Further evidence can be found through examining State practice. Greenpeace highlights, 
“From 2012-2014, the number of Chinese DWF vessels grew from 1,830 to 2,460, [over] ten 
times the size of the US fleet.”43 Some efforts have been made to promote sustainability and an 
annual summer moratorium of fishing in the South China Sea has been in place since the 1990s.44 
Yet, as previously stated, growing subsidies and excessive fleet capacity reveal that any hope in 
China may be misspent. The majority of China’s fleet has to conduct fishing operations in distant 
waters due to domestic overfishing. This can be alleviated, however “If coastal over-fishing can 
be resolved then work can be found nearer home for the fishing sector’s excess capacity.”45 
These links represent causation in the factual sense. However, causation in the legal sense may be 
indicated through trends in legal agreements between States and legal bodies. 
Following the release of the 1993 FAO report, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) entered into force requiring, “member countries to notify the 
WTO of their provisions of subsidies to their industries.”46 Subsequently, the Rome Consensus 
on World Fisheries and the U.N. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (UNCCRF) was 
adopted, and the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development “called upon 
governments to consider reducing subsidies to the fishing industry and abolish incentives leading 
to overfishing.”47 United Nations, FAO and WTO led programs continued to make the link 
between certain subsidies and overfishing in a legal sense inevitably leading to the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). This summit would pave the way for the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals adopted in 2015. However, these initiatives are ‘soft-law’ and 
ultimately still only binding on those that sign them, in accordance with the principle of pacta 
tertiis.  
																																																								
42 Chen-Ju Chen. Fisheries Subsidies under International Law. Vol. 20. Hamburg: International Max Planck 
Research School (IMPRS) for Maritime Affairs at the University of Hamburg (2010): p. 12. 
43 Give a Man a Fish—Five Facts on China’s Distant Water Fishing Subsidies. Briefing, Hong Kong: Greenpeace 
East Asia, 2016. 
44 China has fished itself out of its own waters, so Chinese fishermen are now sticking their rods in other nations’ 
seas. Quartz: April 4, 2017. Online: qz.com/948980/china-has-fished-itself-out-of-its-own-waters-so-chinese-
fishermen-are-now-sticking-their-rods-in-other-nations-seas/ (Accessed July 18, 2018). 
45  Tang Damin. Restoring China’s coastal fisheries: An analysis of the policies that have shaped the country’s 
fishing sector over the last 30 years. China Dialogue –Ocean: March 5, 2018. Online: chinadialogue ocean.net/1826-
restoring-chinas-coastal-fisheries/ (Accessed July 18, 2018). 
46 Supra, note 41. 




Every case and point in regards to subsidies is unique in its own right. Therefore, one 
should avoid generalizations in condemning fisheries subsidies as a whole. As previously 
determined, beneficial subsidies, as well as some ambiguous subsidies can provide much needed 
assistance to protect the oceans from overfishing. However, in the case of capacity enhancing 
subsidies, many sources indicate overcapacity leads to overfishing. This notion is supported 
through data,48 as well as growing trends and efforts in implementing international voluntary 
agreements. Sumaila argues, “Because capacity-enhancing subsidies increase profits artificially, 
they are stimulating this “race to fish” within the industry. This is having disastrous 
consequences for many fish populations.” Based on UN statements, academic findings, FAO 
data,49 State practice (China), and the timeline and content of legal treaties and non-voluntary 
guidelines, one can conclude there exists a causal link between capacity-enhancing subsidies and 
overfishing. To support this conclusion, Chen argues, “It should be clear that overfishing could 
not take place without overcapacity.”50 While the WTO negotiates new trade rules regarding this 
issue, attention must be drawn to the law of the sea and the primary instrument for fisheries 
regulation; UNCLOS. 
 
Chapter 3: Fisheries in the Law of the Sea 
 
The international legal regime for fisheries is primarily regulated through legally binding 
treaties, voluntary instruments, regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), domestic 
legislation, and global environmental treaties. Of these, UNCLOS provides the overarching 
framework, yet leaves the specific details of management to the coastal/flag State. This is 
especially pertinent to the EEZ where coastal States exercise a large degree of discretion over 
resource management, yet regulation remains the most in depth, in comparison to others within 
UNCLOS. The following section will seek to ascertain whether the regulation of EEZ fisheries 
through UNCLOS addresses subsidies. 
																																																								
48 For more information, please see Sumaila: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1046/j.1467-2979.2002.00081.x. 
49 FAO data primarily indicates global fleet sizes, global capture of fish, etc., however they have stated, “[there is 
a…] strong correlation between fisheries subsidies and […] overcapacity and overfishing.” See more at: 
www.fao.org/3/a-i8003e.pdf.	
50 Supra, note 42 at p. 12-13. 	
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3.1 Fisheries Regime Under UNCLOS 
 
 UNCLOS strives to “promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and 
efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources and the study, 
protection and preservation of the marine environment.”51  Fisheries are regulated through a mix 
of coastal State and flag State jurisdiction and sovereignty. Within UNCLOS, the fisheries regime 
is a “complex collection of nine sub-regimes.”52 Of these, three take a “zonal management 
approach,”53 with the coastal State maintaining sovereignty and jurisdiction over resources within 
200nm, while flag State jurisdiction over fisheries is largely afforded on the high seas, as it 
constitutes an area beyond national jurisdiction. When fishing inside the EEZ of a coastal State, 
the jurisdiction over a third State vessel lies with the “State whose flag they fly.”54 However, 
non-compliance can result in enforcement by the coastal State who maintains the sovereign rights 
over the management of the resources, as per UNCLOS Article 73.55  
The remaining 6 sub-regimes are “functional in nature,”56 and take a “species specific 
approach.”57 These include shared and straddling fish stocks, as well as highly migratory species, 
marine mammals, anadromous stocks and catadromous species. However, as Tanaka points out, 
“[these measures are] inadequate to conserve living resources in the oceans.”58 This is in part due 
to the EEZ exclusion clause within UNCLOS, as well as a more detailed regime for fisheries 
conservation, beyond the current more general provisions. Due to these inadequacies of UNCLOS 
in sufficiently addressing modern day unsustainable fishing practices in the high seas, the 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (FSA) was established to address straddling and 
highly migratory species. The FSA primarily utilizes RFMOs to employ and regulate 
conservation measures over certain stocks in distinct areas. Ultimately, the effectiveness of 
																																																								
51 Supra, note 9 at preamble. 
52 Donald R. Rothwell and T. Stephens. The International Law of the Sea. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2016, p. 321. 
53 Yoshifumi Tanaka. "The Changing Approaches to Conservation of Marine Living Resources in International 
Law." Heidelberg Journal of International Law 71, no. 2 (2011): 291-330, p. 292. 
54 Supra, note 12 at p. 10. 
55 Supra, note 9 at art. 73.	
56 Supra, note 52. 
57 Supra, note 53. 
58 Ibid. 
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RFMOs depends on the cooperation of States in joining, as its binding powers extend only so far 
as its members, which is in line with the principle of pacta tertiis. However, as Young indicates, 
“[Non-parties…] may still be subject to the UNCLOS obligation to cooperate in the conservation 
and management of the relevant shared fish stocks.”59  
 
3.2 The EEZ Regime 
 
The completion of UNCLOS drastically altered the oceans, as what were previously high 
seas areas were subsequently sectioned off into distinct maritime zones affording duties, rights 
and freedoms to States. Among those included was the right to resources, both living and non-
living. An area of major importance was the realization of the EEZ. This was an “essential 
element”60 at the negotiating table during the Geneva Conventions, which ultimately led to the 
finalization of UNCLOS. Nordquist argues, “This concept is one of the most important pillars of 
the [UNCLOS],”61 while Young concurs, “[UNCLOS’] greatest impact on fisheries governance 
has been the recognition [of the EEZ].”62 The EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles (nm) from 
baselines established around the low water points of the shoreline.63 Such a massive area now 
represents one third of ocean space and as Young notes, “[i]t was also hoped that [the] enclosure 
of these areas […] would allow for better resource management.”64 Young’s quote directly hints 
to Hardin’s article, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” which indicated that if there were a shared 
resource, and everyone acts out of their own self-interest, the resource would eventually become 
overexploited.65 Although aspirations may have been high for the EEZ, this massive amount of 
sea where resources could be exploited unfortunately has led to overexploitation in many cases.  
Prior to the introduction of the EEZ, these waters were previous considered high seas with 
free access to all States. The introduction of the EEZ has lead to overexploitation not entirely as a 
result of coastal State resource management rights, but largely in part due to the advancements in 
																																																								
59 Supra, note 8 at Executive Summary. 
60 Jean Carroz. “The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Historical Perspective.” The Law of the Sea – Le Droit et la Mer – 
El Derecho y el Mar. FAO, Rome, 1987.		
61 Myron H. Nordquist, Satya Nandan, and Shabtai Rosenne. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Commentary 
1982 . Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia, Leiden: Brill, 2013, p. 508 at V. 31. 
62 Margaret A. Young. "Fragmentation or interaction: the WTO, fisheries subsidies and international law." World 
Trade Review 8, no. 4 (2009): 477-515, p. 481. 
63 Supra, note 9 at art. 57. 
64 Supra, note 12. 
65 Garrett Hardin. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162, no. 3859 (Dec 13, 1968): 1243-1248.  
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technology and the “race to fish” that has been caused by overcapacity of vessels. However, as 
will be discussed later, poor resource management and overcapacity together, can pose 
detrimental effects for marine living resources and sustainable fishing practices.  
 
3.3 Coastal State Sovereign Rights and Obligations 
 
 The EEZ regime is primarily regulated through Part V of UNCLOS. Article 56(1)(a) 
grants the coastal State sovereign rights for the purpose of “exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing its resources.”66 The content here is effectively jurisdictional in order to promote 
effective conservation and management within the EEZ. This means that the coastal State has the 
sovereign right to prescribe laws and enforce them regarding the management of its resources. 
The coastal State maintains the sovereignty to perform these rights and duties, yet under Article 
56(2), “the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act 
in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.”67  
The “conservation of living resources” is the basic duty under Article 61 of UNCLOS 
regarding living resources, specifically fisheries within the EEZ.68 “Conservation,” in accordance 
with its ordinary meaning is defined as, “Preservation, protection, or restoration of the natural 
environment and of wildlife.”69 Beyerlin and Holzer state, “Although conservation is used 
frequently in international treaties dealing with natural resources, none of them actually defines 
this concept.”70 In this light, the concept remains a little vague, however, preservation, protection 
and sustainability are frequently associated with the term through treaties.71 These terms lead to 
the object and purpose, which aim to preserve and protect, as opposed to exploit and damage. 
Furthermore, the object and purpose is directly in accordance with UNCLOS Part XII. 
Within UNCLOS, conservation and utilization are two of the main features detailed under 
Articles 61 and 62 of Part V. This includes the determination capacity of the coastal State with 
respect to the total allowable catch (TAC) as well as the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), 
																																																								
66 Supra, note 9 at art. 56(1)(a). 
67 Ibid, art. 56(2). 
68 Ibid, art. 61. 
69 “Conservation [Def. 1.1]” Oxford Dictionary Online. (n.d.) Online: en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
conservation (Accessed August 8, 2018). 
70 Ulrich Beyerlin, Vanessa Holzer. "Conservation of Natural Resources." Oxford Public International Law. Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL). October 2013. Online: opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1569 (Accessed July 28, 2018), para. 10. 
71 See: Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 1, Rio Declaration, prin. 4, Stockholm Declaration, prin. 21. 
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while ensuring through the best scientific data available that such stocks will not fall to levels of 
endangerment through overexploitation.72 To this end, cooperation with competent international 
organizations shall be endeavoured under Article 61. Young points out, “additional agreements, 
including the [FSA] and some regional treaties, require the coastal State to adopt the 
precautionary approach to conservation and management measures where scientific evidence is 
insufficient.”73 According to Article 6(2) of the FSA, the precautionary approach indicates, 
“States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate.”74  
Under Article 62(1) the objective is optimum utilization of resources.75 According to 
Article 62(2), the coastal State shall, “ensure through proper conservation and management 
measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the [EEZ] is not endangered by over-
exploitation.”76 Articles 61 to 73 effectively outline that fisheries populations should produce the 
maximum sustainable yield,77 while cooperation78, the best scientific evidence available79, the 
relevant environmental and economic factors as well as the needs of coastal fishing communities 
shall be considered.80 Furthermore, if a coastal State is unable to harvest the entire allowable 
catch, access to the surplus shall be provided to third-States.81 Here it is revealed, “the natural 
resource does not belong to the coastal State, which instead has exclusive competence to manage 
these fisheries subject to internationally agreed rules and policies.” 82 However, State practice has 
shown surplus’ have provided heavily subsidized massive fishing fleets such as those in the EU 
and China an opportunity to overexploit resources outside of their own overfished maritime 
zones and closer to shore than the high seas. 
Whether a State exploits its resources, or allocates its surplus, exploitation rights must be 
balanced not only with the conservation measures of UNCLOS Part V, but with Articles 192 and 
193 as well. However, within the EEZ there exists no explicit mention of fisheries subsidies. 
																																																								
72 Supra, note 9 at art. 61. 
73 Supra, note 12 at p. 13. 
74 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, (Dec. 4, 1995), 2167 UNTS 88. Entry into force: Dec. 11, 2001, art. 6(2). 
75 Supra, note 9 at art. 62(1). 
76 Ibid, art. 62(2). 
77 Ibid, art. 61(3). 
78 Ibid, arts. 61, 64-66, 69. 
79 Ibid, art. 61(2). 
80 Ibid, arts. 61(3), 62(3), 69(3). 
81 Ibid, art. 62(2). 
82 Donald R. Rothwell, Alex G. Oude Elferink, Karen N. Scott, Tim Stephens (Eds). The Oxford Handbook of the 
Law of the Sea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 803. 
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Here they must be read in through a highly probable causal relationship between subsidies and 
overfishing. Beyond question, capacity enhancing subsidies lead to overcapacity, however, 
nowhere in UNCLOS is it mentioned that overcapacity is prohibited. Scientific data, research and 
cooperation, as previously mentioned, are fundamental aspects of EEZ marine living resource 
management. Therefore, if the coastal State’s data and research were to reveal paltry fish stocks, 
continued efforts to increase fishing efforts despite the data would appear to be in direct 
contradiction of conservation and management objectives of Part V and Part XII. This blatant 
disregard for current stock levels has left some oversized fishing fleets with too few domestic fish 
left to catch, which has instead shifted their interests to other EEZs. 
 
3.4 Access to Surpluses 
 
 Within the EEZ, if the coastal State does not “have the capacity to harvest the entire 
allowable catch, […they shall] give other States access to the surplus […].”83 Developing States 
that lack the capacity to reach the objective of optimum utilization enable this procedure most 
commonly84 and as Lowe reveals, “the coastal State can charge other States for access to the 
surplus.”85 As an example, “In 2004, the EU paid €86 million to Mauritania for access to its 
EEZ.”86 These types of investments are critically important to the impoverished economies of 
many countries, such as those found in West Africa that often sell access rights to the massive 
fleets of China and the EU, for example. However, State practice has revealed that not only has 
the money charged, not sufficiently equated to the value of resources taken out,87 but lack of 
enforcement powers has also resulted in considerable amounts of third-State overfishing to 
occur.88 In the case of Mauritania, “Mauritania reports that fisheries agreement catch data are 
																																																								
83 Supra, note 9 at art. 62(2). 
84 Kiet Tuan Nguyen. “What are the consequences of overfishing in West-Africa, and how can sustainable and 
flourishing fisheries be promoted?” Masters Thesis (Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences: University of 
Agder), 2012, summary. 
85 Vaughan Lowe. "The Global Environment." International Law, September 2007: 234-264, p. 245. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Boats from China and Europe caught fish valued at $8.3 billion over 10 years (from 2000 – 2010) from the [West 
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magazine/may-july-2017/overfishing-destroying-livelihoods. 
88 Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries . Final Report, UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), with support from the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD), Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd, London: UK Government, July 2005, Section 
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often reported very late and there is no provision for scrutiny of landing of catches outside 
Mauritania by Mauritanian officials.”89 This exemplifies the obligations of flag States regarding 
jurisdiction and the importance of duty-compliance standards. Otherwise, third-party access can 
effectively create a loophole where developing States are financially pressured to sell access 
rights yet, they cannot enforce their own EEZ and effectively comply with UNCLOS obligations, 
while flag States seemingly do too little to prevent overfishing in many cases.  
 The aforementioned example illustrates a scenario, which could effectively lead to a 
dispute between the coastal State and the flag State. However, could there also be a dispute 
whereby a third State seeks to initiate proceedings against a coastal State for failure to comply 
with Part V obligations in regards to fisheries, such as setting a TAC or preventing fish stocks 
from reaching a level of endangerment through overexploitation?  
 
3.5 Other Maritime Zones 
 
 Enshrined within UNCLOS, the territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles from the 
territorial baseline.90 Section 1, Part 2 of UNCLOS affords sovereignty over the water column, 
seabed and airspace, effectively giving the coastal State sovereignty over the natural resources. 
Importantly, “the duties relating to conservation and management established by UNCLOS apply 
to the territorial sea.”91 Yet, no mention of subsidies exists in the regime of the territorial 
sea/contiguous zone.  
 Under the high seas regime the freedom of fishing exists, yet this freedom must be 
exercised in accordance with “due regard” of other States.92 Within Article 116, “all States have 
the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to […] their treaty 
obligations [… as well as…] the interests of the coastal State.”93 Section 2 of the high seas 
regime calls for States to cooperate in the conservation and management of living resources, 
particularly through RFMOs. States are obliged to use the best scientific data available as well as 
generally recommended international minimum standards for conservation measures.94 As an 
																																																								
89 Ibid. 
90 Supra, note 9 at art. 3. 
91 Supra, note 12. 
92 Supra, note 9 at art. 87. 
93 Ibid, art. 116. 
94 Ibid, art. 119. 
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UNCLOS implementing agreement, the FSA provides greater detail of these measures. Within the 
preamble of the FSA, “excessive fleet size”95 is listed as a problem the FSA seeks to resolve. 
Furthermore, Article 5(h) of the FSA indicates that States shall, “take measures to prevent or 
eliminate overfishing and excess fishing capacity.”96 Herein lies a direct link to subsidies, 
however this link is made through the FSA, with application specific to highly migratory and 




Excessive fleet size is a direct result of capacity enhancing subsidies and an important 
link for subsidies in the realm of the law of the sea. However, the FSA is limited in its scope of 
application, specifically in regards to the EEZ. UNCLOS provides a framework for fisheries 
regulation, but it contains no explicit reference to fisheries subsidies. The most in depth fisheries 
provisions within UNCLOS are found in the EEZ regime, however the coastal State retains the 
sovereign rights over resource management. As previously indicated, Tanaka argues that current 
measures are insufficient. However, if these provisions are to be reinterpreted and weighed 
against environmental obligations, alternatives may be provided.  
 
Chapter 4: UNCLOS Environmental Obligations for Coastal States 
 
 The sovereign rights and duties within the EEZ are afforded to coastal and third States 
through Part V of UNCLOS. These rights however, must be balanced with environmental 
obligations, which are primarily regulated through Part XII of UNCLOS. The following section 
will address protection and preservation of the marine environment within the EEZ before 
addressing Part XII obligations and how the regime corresponds with Part V. This relationship 
poses an important question: within a coastal State’s own EEZ, do the sovereign rights to explore 
and exploit natural resources supersede environment obligations and duties? Furthermore, what is 
the limit of applicability for Article 192? These questions are important to essentially determine 
if the right to exploit living resources outweighs the wrongdoings of over-exploitation.	
																																																								
95 Supra, note 74 at preamble. 
96 Ibid, art. 5(h).	
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4.1 Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment – Part V 
 
Regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment within the EEZ, 
Article 56(1)(b)(iii) affords the coastal State ‘jurisdiction’ over such matters,97 while creating 
rights and duties for other States. The distinctly different verbiage seen here, using ‘jurisdiction’ 
as opposed to ‘rights’ over marine resources provided for under Article 56(1)(a) implies authority 
versus access. The ‘weight’ afforded under UNCLOS Article 56(1)(b)(iii) is of considerable 
importance with respect to State jurisdiction to protect and preserve the marine environment. This 
provision however, must be read in accordance with Article 19398 in its applicability regarding 
the relationship between ‘conservation’ and ‘protection’. It would appear that UNCLOS indicates 
a linkage of exploitation and management rights with the duties of the coastal State to protect the 
marine environment through the conservation of living resources. Czybulka notes, “[EEZ 
exploitation] rights are not given unconditionally.”99 Furthermore, he suggests, 
Coastal States have functional gathered competences and rights to exploit resources as well as competences 
and jurisdiction or other legal powers to pursue the integration of environmental policies in their national laws 
regarding human activities in the EEZ […] in order to fulfil their specific duty as a coastal State to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.100 
Article 58 of UNCLOS imposes specific obligations on the flag State within the EEZ of 
the coastal State.101 Rights for the flag State include navigation, for example, while duties 
specifically pertain to due regard and compliance with the coastal States’ laws and regulations.102 
The basic obligation for the conservation and management of marine living resources within the 
EEZ is outlined under UNCLOS Article 61. In order to achieve this, the coastal State is obliged to 
set the total allowable catch within the EEZ. When achieving this, Article 61(4) of UNCLOS 
requires, “the effects on species associated with or depend upon harvested species”103 to be taken 
into consideration. Harrison argues that “species” could include “any other flora or fauna living 
																																																								
97 Supra, note 9 at art. 56(1)(b)(iii). 
98 UNCLOS Art. 193: States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their 
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Alexander Proelss (Ed.). Munich: C. H. Beck, 2017, p. 1292, para. 11. 
100 Ibid, pp. 1292-93, para. 12. 
101 Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2 April 
2015, ITLOS Reports 2015, para. 111. 
102 Supra, note 9 at art. 58(3). 
103 Ibid, art. 61(4). 
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in the same marine ecosystem.”104 This, in turn could be interpreted broadly enough so as to 
support an “ecosystems approach to fisheries.”105 In order to substantiate his claims, Harrison 
cites Article 194(5) of UNCLOS, as well as the South China Sea Arbitration, which will be 
explored below. This highlights that exploitation freedoms often hinge first on a determination of 
the effects on the marine environment prior to implementation and subsequent exploitation. 
 
4.2 Can Exploitation and Environmental Protection Be Read Together? 
 
United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Miguel de Serpa Soares, 
states, “UNCLOS embodies the three pillars of sustainable development; social, economic and 
environmental and sets forth the legal framework for the sustainable development of the oceans 
and seas.”106  However, it must be noted that sustainable development can only be implicitly read 
into UNCLOS, as the term is nowhere explicitly mentioned. In support of this notion, Lyons 
argues, “UNCLOS Article 193 is about sustainable development.”107 Here we can begin to see 
that exploitation is to be read in accordance with general environmental provisions to achieve 
sustainability. However, there is an argument to be made that the general obligation found under 
Article 192 to protect and preserve the marine environment is inapplicable under Part V of 
UNCLOS.108 The language contained under Article 56 mirrors that of Article 192, specifically 
‘protection and preservation of the marine environment.’ Interpreting Article 192 as inapplicable 
due to the “more specific regulation”109 contained under Part V however would be incorrect. In 
this light, Czybulka notes, “Art. 56(1) assigns jurisdiction to coastal States in the EEZ 
specifically in order to enable them to implement the duties of the environmental part of the 
Convention.”110 Additionally, under UNCLOS Article 56(1)(b), the words “as provided for in the 
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relevant provisions of this convention,”111 are in direct reference to Part XII,112 thus enabling the 
relationship.  
 
4.3 Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment – Part XII 
 
 ‘Protection and preservation of the marine environment’ is a fundamental part of 
UNCLOS (Part XII), which applies to all maritime zones.113 Part XII is the most far-reaching 
instrument for which the marine environment is substantially protected. Article 192 establishes 
duties, while sovereign rights are outlined under Article 193 “regarding the stewardship of the 
oceans.”114 Article 192 confers a general obligation on States that must be considered, while 
succeeding articles outline more specific provisions primarily related to pollution. However, in 
Chagos Marine Protected Area, the Tribunal rejected that Part XII is solely limited to measures 
regarding pollution.115 This finding expands the general obligation under UNCLOS Article 192, 
which still remains broad, ultimately extending the limits further. Due to its indefinite limits, the 
scope of applicability is not pre-defined. In this light, it demands further attention.   
 
4.4 The General Obligation of Article 192 
 
The general obligation under Article 192 reflects the entire scope of the subsequent 
section. As the article is general in nature, it thereby fails to set the limits of application, or 
expand on the words within the provision. In order to specify these, one must first interpret the 
meaning of the individual terms of the provision in accordance with their ordinary meaning and 
in light of their context and purpose in accordance with the VCLT. 
 
4.4.1 The Meaning of ‘Protect’ and ‘Preserve’ 
 
A simplified understanding of the terms, ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ might suggest that 
																																																								
111 Supra, note 9 at art. 56(1)(b). 
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114 Ibid, p. 1278, para 1. 
115 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, Mauritius v United Kingdom, Final Award, ICGJ 486 (PCA 2015), 
18th March 2015, Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA], para. 320. 
	 21 
‘protect’ entails the prevention of harm from occurring, while ‘preserve’ relates to maintaining 
the current condition. This interpretation is supported by Czybulka, who stated, the “wide-
ranging [Article 192 obligation] requires the prevention of suspected negative changes of the 
marine environment through its use.”116 Furthermore, the obligation requires “taking active 
measures to preserve the ocean as an ecosystem and to minimize pollution.”117 Although 
“ecosystem” is only mentioned once in UNCLOS under Article 194(5), Czybulka’s interpretation 
could be read so as to include the ecosystem approach into the reading of Article 192. This is 
especially pertinent as there is no set definition of the ecosystem approach.118 Perhaps the most 
valuable analysis of Article 192 in relation to ‘protect and preserve’ was determined in the South 
China Sea Arbitration: 
The “general obligation” extends both to “protection” of the marine environment from future damage and 
“preservation” in the sense of maintaining or improving its present condition. Article 192 thus entails the 
positive obligation to take active measures to protect and preserve the marine environment, and […] entails 
the negative obligation not to degrade the marine environment.119 
Not only does the Tribunal’s interpretation shed some light on what ‘protect and preserve’ 
entails, but also they defined them in light of the positive and negative obligations, which will be 
expanded on in due course.  
 
4.4.2 The Meaning of ‘Marine Environment’ 
 
The ordinary meaning of ‘marine environment’ could be described as a comprehensive 
area so as to include everything below the water, as well as those areas in the immediate vicinity 
that share the water, such as beaches or airspace. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons120 and Iron Rhine121 made efforts to define environment, but the definitions lacked 
specificity relating to the marine environment. Malta’s draft articles for the Convention provided 
arguably one of the best definitions; “the marine environment comprises the surface of the sea, 
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the air space above, the water column and the seabed […] including the biosystems therein or 
dependent upon.”122 The status as a preparatory work of UNCLOS is important, as this definition 
would qualify as a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the VCLT.123  
 
4.5 General Obligation of Article 192 
 
Through interpreting the wording of Article 192, the scope becomes clearer, however the 
obligations that are imposed require further insight. As the protection and preservation must be 
considered in all maritime zones, it would naturally follow that the general obligation is 
universally obligatory. Although this has not received universal endorsement, Harrison notes, the 
terms ‘protect and preserve,’ as espoused under Article 192, “arguably”124 creates an erga omnes 
binding obligation on all States within all maritime zones. “The […] obligation rather requires 
the prevention of suspected negative changes of the marine environment […] [including] taking 
active measures to preserve the ocean and an ecosystem […].125 Such measures endeavour not 
only to preserve the marine environment in the future, but also to maintain or improve the present 
condition.126 This means that coastal States’ sovereign rights over resources are, “broad but not 
unlimited.”127 The South China Sea Arbitration aptly characterized these differing obligations as 
positive and negative obligations,128 and found “this duty informs the scope of the general 
obligation in Article 192.”129 In this light, one could make the case that both negative and 
positive obligations apply to governments subsidizing flag State and coastal State vessels. Nilufer 
Oral suggests, “this would have tremendous significance for States to bring actions for harm to 
the marine environment of shared marine spaces regardless of sovereignty or maritime 
																																																								
122 “Malta: Draft Articles on the Preservation of the Marine Environment.” International Legal Materials 
(Cambridge University Press) 12, no. 3 (May 1973): 583-590, art. 1. 
123 Supra, note 14 at art. 32. 
124 Supra, note 104 at p. 24. 
125 Supra, note 99 at p. 1286, para 23. 
126 Ibid, p. 1286, para 24. 
127 Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor, Malaysia v Singapore, Provisional measures, 
ITLOS Case No 12, ICGJ 354 (ITLOS 2003), 8th October 2003, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
[ITLOS], [Joint Declaration of Judges Ad Hoc Hossain and Oxman]. 
128 Supra, note 113. 
129 Ibid, para. 941.	
	 23 
entitlements.”130 However, one must first determine the extent to which this obligation extends 
and whether it creates an erga omnes binding obligation on all States. 
 
4.6 Are UNCLOS Article 192 Obligations Erga Omnes? 
 
For any third party to be able to bring a case against a coastal State, the obligation must 
be erga omnes, and, “the obligation described in Article 192 applies to and is owed to all 
States.”131 It is unclear in law (still) whether or not Part XII obligations are obligations erga 
omnes, as well as whether they are applicable to a coastal State’s EEZ. Johnstone indicates, 
“[Little] has been written about third States’ rights to invoke responsibility when a State willfully 
or negligently contaminates its own EEZ.”132 However, if the obligation is in fact owed to all 
States, then it most likely concerns all States. Henriksen who argued, “The obligations to protect 
and preserve the marine environment probably qualifies as an erga omnes obligation,” 133 reached 
a similar conclusion. Unfortunately, academics have been generally reluctant to actually affirm 
peremptorily that Part XII obligations are erga omnes, as indicated by use of their language such 
as ‘probably’, ‘arguably’, etc. 134 Fitzmaurice has somewhat expressed his doubts, 135 while 
tribunals have sidestepped the question altogether, seen most recently in South China Sea.  
“The doctrine of an obligation erga omnes means that a State need not show actual direct 
harm in order to hold another State responsible for a breach of an international obligation.”136 
Additionally, Mendis notes, “the concept of jus cogens137 also provides a legal ground for the 
action of states not directly damaged,”138 yet Malm unconvincingly suggests “erga omnes may 
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have the nature of jus cogens as well.”139 The threshold for invoking a violation against a coastal 
State then does not necessarily demand individual harm. “Thus, any State will have standing to 
sue for breach or non-compliance.”140 Environmental harm per se can be traced back to the term 
“wrongful act,” which in turn falls under Article 2: Elements of an internationally wrongful act of 
a State, under the 2001 International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. There is an internationally wrongful act when, “conduct 
consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”141 Acts contrary to the provisions 
of Part XII under UNCLOS might satisfy many of the requirements under the ILC Articles. 
 There is some debate on whether the Draft Articles are binding or not on States, hence at 
the very least, they are soft law.142 However, as Beckman and Davenport state, the strength of 
soft law “should not be underestimated.”143 “International courts have taken into account soft-law 
principles in so far as they articulate general principles agreed by consensus.” 144  As 
representative of opinion juris, they are an “authoritative statement of the rules on State 
responsibility,”145 and may assist in strengthening the case to bring an erga omnes suit against a 
State for effectively facilitating overfishing through harmful subsidies. 
The ILC Draft Articles were referred to in the Seabed Dispute Chamber’s Advisory 
Opinion: Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, however the scope of application was limited to two maritime 
zones. Referencing Article 48 of the ILC Draft Articles, ITLOS stated, “Each State Party may 
also be entitled to claim compensation in light of the erga omnes character of the obligations 
relating to preservation of the environment of the high seas and in the Area.”146 Interestingly 
though, in the Draft Articles, the ILC mentioned environment as a collective interest which might 
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fall within the scope of erga omnes.147 Meanwhile, Robinson argues, “The evidence in state 
practice is growing that the duty is at least erga omnes,”148 which means judicial interpretation is 
the final hurdle to solidify its universal application. 
 
4.7 Due Diligence/Due Regard 
 
To prove the harmlessness of an activity in order to fulfill its Part XII obligations, there is 
a process that requires the undertaking of due diligence.  One case to shed light on this is Land 
Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor [Malaysia v Singapore] 
[Provisional Measures]. Judges Hossain and Oxman determined that States must show due 
regard and take into account the rights of other States, as well as the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment.149 Under this rationale, due diligence obligations must be taken to 
avoid negative changes of the marine environment. However, although closely linked, due 
diligence and due regard entail different responsibilities, which must be explored further.  
 
 4.7.1 General Discussion of Due Diligence/Due Regard 
 
 Due diligence obligations are referred to only once under UNCLOS, while due regard is 
referenced frequently albeit with no set definition/explanation. Regarding its origins in UNCLOS, 
Gaunce states, “The obligation of “due regard” is one of the key mechanisms adopted in 
[UNCLOS] to balance the potentially competing interests of coastal states and other uses of the 
new maritime zone, the [EEZ], recognized by [UNCLOS].”150 This explanation appears to 
indicate due regard as an abstract mechanism. In South China Sea, the Tribunal used the wording, 
“to exercise due diligence [and…] to exhibit due regard.”151 From this wording, one could 
conclude that “exercise” entails a process of physically doing something, while “exhibit” means 
to demonstrate/prove that something has physically been done.  
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4.7.2 The Relationship with UNCLOS Articles 192 and 193 
 
When asked to define “due diligence” in Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the 
Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
instead referred back to relevant case law. Referring specifically to Case Concerning Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), due diligence was defined as: 
An obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level 
of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private 
operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the 
other party. 152 
South China Sea mirrors this initial definition where due diligence refers to the active obligation 
to adopt and exercise tangible rules and measures (the process), followed by the due regard 
obligation to exhibit and prove them. From this obligation, “adopting appropriate rules and 
measures to prohibit a harmful practice is only one component of the due diligence required by 
States pursuant to the general obligation of Article 192.”153  
UNCLOS Article 193 confirms this notion as it remarks, “States have the sovereign right 
to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with 
their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.”154 Interpreting this based on the 
aforementioned conclusion would mean that the process of adopting and implementing 
environmental policy would fall under the scope of due diligence. Meanwhile, due regard falls 
under the positive obligation to show measures have been taken regarding marine environmental 
protection and preservation. However, Article 193 must be read in the context of Article 192, 
which is broad in its obligations. In this light, Schatz argues, “The wording of Art. 192, however, 
is too general to establish a qualified due diligence obligation on the flag state.”155 This generality 
however applies to the flag State in this regard, but coastal States in general, as Article 193 is 
more precise in its obligations to the coastal State.   
Under UNCLOS Article 193, the word ‘pursuant’ supports the argument that 
environmental policy supersedes exploitation rights. Rothwell and Stephens argue, “This duty is 
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elevated above the sovereign right of States to exploit their natural resources.”156 Additional 
support of this notion are echoed under Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm Declaration), as well as Article 3 of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). All of these legal instruments reiterate that the sovereign right to exploit 
resources is pursuant to their own environmental policy, consistent with Part XII of UNCLOS.  
Ultimately, UNCLOS Article 192 provides a general obligation on States to protect and 
preserve the marine environment. This creates a positive due diligence obligation to take steps to 
avoid harm from happening. Article 193 confirms States have the sovereign right to exploit their 
resources, but only in accordance with the elevated provision of Article 192 over both Article 
193, as well as sovereign exploitation rights.  
 
4.8 Limit of Applicability for Article 192 
 
 In order to determine whether or not subsides could fall within UNCLOS Article 192, the 
limit of said article must first be scrutinized. As previously discussed, subsidies must be read 
implicitly into UNCLOS, and there is nothing prohibiting overcapacity. However, overcapacity 
often leads to overfishing and if a coastal State continued to entice and increase fishing efforts, 
despite worsening stock depletion, this could be viewed as contrary to Article 192.  
 The wording of Article 192 is vague, but it provides a general obligation. As it would be 
impossible for UNCLOS to remain completely relevant with changing ocean trends, the treaty 
was designed to incorporate rules of reference. Czybulka notes, “Part XII is designed as an 
environmental framework and specifically leads the way to further embodiments through regional 
and sub-regional treaties and agreements.”157 Therefore, Article 192 must be interpreted in the 
form of other agreements and this informs the limit. The FAO is responsible for numerous soft-
law documents related to overfishing and unregulated fishing, such as the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, which indicates States should prevent overfishing and excess fishing 
capacity.158 The FSA preamble also indicates this issue as a target to prevent. Furthermore, UN 
voluntary agreements such as the SDGs directly address subsidies and their role in overfishing.  
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  UNCLOS Article 237 enables one to interpret Article 192 more broadly so as to include 
the compatibility with other (more specific) agreements in the endeavour to protect and preserve 
the marine environment. This ultimately appears to create a positive obligation on the coastal 
State. However, the incorporation of other rules and agreements may ultimately fall flat given the 
rule of pacta tertiis, unless the rules are read into to inform the scope of Article 192, such as the 
way the tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration used the CBD to inform the applicability of 




Under UNCLOS Article 56(1)(a), it is not entirely clear whether or not exploring and 
exploiting were meant to be read in accordance with conserving and managing, or not. However, 
scholars indicate sustainable development is intrinsic to UNCLOS, which would suggest a unified 
reading is to be undertaken. The ‘weight’ of environmental jurisdiction under Article 56(1)(b)(iii) 
is significant in nature too, as its potential to hamper freedom of navigation, for example, is 
noteworthy. But, one must take care to note the due regard obligation on visiting third States. 
Part XII creates a general obligation on States, yet its erga omnes powers are not absolute 
as the debate continues amongst legal scholars. However, ‘protect and preserve,’ as well as 
‘marine environment’ cover a large scope of applicability, which has largely been determined 
through relevant case law. Within this scope, as per South China Sea, there exists both positive 
and negative obligations. States are under a due regard obligation to show they have exercised 
due diligence in order to avoid negative effects of their actions on the marine environment. Here 
one could find an implicit inclusion of preventing subsidies leading to overcapacity and 
overfishing. Positive/negative obligations are paramount and exhibited through a myriad of 
treaties, which explicitly mention; exploitation rights must be pursuant to environmental policy. 
From this, it is shown that Part XII obligations supersede Part V coastal State exploitation rights 
and freedoms. Furthermore, the marine environment covers a wide array of application, and 
specifically in line with the ruling of Southern Bluefin Tuna, applies to marine living resources. 
However, the limit of applicability of Article 192 may ultimately depend on the obligations under 
other conventions as they might inform the limit through more specific rules and standards. 
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Chapter 5: Dispute Settlement for EEZ Fisheries 
 
After determining environmental obligations outweigh exploitation rights within the EEZ, 
it must now be determined whether harmful subsidies can be deemed in breach of UNCLOS. If 
so, what legal options under UNCLOS exist for mandatory dispute settlement procedures for 
subsidies contributing to overfishing within the EEZ? In this light, the State responsible for the 
action, as well as the obligation that has been breached must be first determined. The role of 
coastal State and flag State will be contrasted in this regard. Lastly, a brief overview of ‘flags of 
convenience’ will be undertaken to illustrate one of the ongoing issues for fisheries management. 
As previously concluded in Chapter 2, it can be viably argued there exists a causal 
relationship between overfishing and capacity enhancing subsidies, although each case should be 
examined individually. Although there currently exists some options for mandatory dispute 
settlement within the UNCLOS regime pertaining to overexploitation of marine fisheries, such as 
ITLOS, the ICJ, or an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, these options may only be enforceable against 
the flag State and subsidies must be implicitly included. In addition, as Schatz points out, “flag 
States would not be liable even in cases of noncompliance of their vessels provided the flag state 
undertook “all necessary and appropriate measures” to meet its due diligence obligations.”160 
Regarding coastal State fisheries discretion within the EEZ, Article 297(3)(a) provides an 
exclusion clause. However, there may exist a bypass option under Article 298(1)(b). 
Furthermore, the possible inclusion of biodiversity may lead towards another alternative way to 
frame the issue of subsidies leading to overfishing under UNCLOS. 
 
5.1 Do Harmful Fisheries Subsidies Breach UNCLOS? 
 
Many States would argue that fisheries subsidies fall exclusively under WTO law, and 
that would not be the first time a trade/UNCLOS issue has been the subject of deciding in which 
legal framework to address the issue.161 As subsidies are nowhere explicitly mentioned in 
UNCLOS, they must first be interpreted indirectly under the general obligation of Article 192, 
and subsequently balanced with exploitation rights under Article 193 and Part V. Additionally, 
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subsidies should be read through the use of “activities,” espoused through EIAs, as well as a root 
cause in domestic overfishing practices. These harmful practices ultimately violate both general 
and specific Part V/Part XII obligations. Ishikawa states, “It should be noted that the [European] 
Commission might find that the provision of fisheries subsidies contributing to IUU [illegal, 
unreported and unregulated] fishing indirectly constitutes a violation of [UNCLOS], depending 
on the facts of the case.”162 In April 2015, the European Commission flagged Thailand for 
contributing to IUU fishing outside its maritime zones. The basis for its decision was, “declining 
fish stocks, reduced fishing area (EEZ area closures and loss of access to third country coastal 
states waters) and an increasing fishing capacity (circa 4 000 commercial vessels in 2011 to 7 000 
in 2014).”163 Although Ishikawa uses IUU fishing and the Commission as an example, harmful 
capacity-enhancing subsidies leading to overexploitation were directly linked to the root cause 
and can have a similar result as IUU fishing on the marine environment, and in some cases, such 
as that of Thailand, can even help perpetuate IUU fishing. 
 Whenever something is not explicitly mentioned, it must examined whether or not the 
scope is wide enough be read implicitly to find legal relevance. The fundamental issue is the 
practice of overfishing as it violates environmental provisions spanning numerous treaties, 
including UNCLOS and the CBD. Overfishing causes negative reactions to the marine 
environment and the general ecosystem. Within the scope of UNCLOS Part XII, financially 
facilitating fisheries growth in an environment that cannot sustain it might be interpreted as an 
activity, thus demanding an EIA be conducted. The coastal State is accountable for overseeing 
the exploitation of living resources within its maritime zones, and if it neglects them in such a 
way so as to cause depletion, either proper scientific research has not been adequately conducted, 
or the enforcement of vessels under its jurisdiction was insufficient. As was the case in Canada, 
the government subsidized the industry to a degree of unsustainability, which inevitably led to 
the depletion of its cod fishery. Herein lies but one example of what can ultimately become of 
this practice, which should give an UNCLOS dispute settlement court/tribunal the jurisdiction 
ratione materiae. Although it may be concluded that subsidies play a part in contributing to 
																																																								
162 Yoshimichi Ishikawa. “Post-Beunos Aires: Fisheries Subsidies Contributing to IUU Fishing through Unilateral 
Trade Measures?” EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law, January 12, 2018. Online: 
www.ejiltalk.org/post-buenos-aires-tackling-fisheries-subsidies-contributing-to-iuu-fishing-through-unilateral-trade-
measures/ (Accessed August 13, 2018). 
163 “Commission Decision of 21 April 2015 on notifying a third country of the possibility of being identified as a 
non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.” Official Journal of the 
European Union C 142. (April 29, 2015): 7-17, para. 31.  
	 31 
overfishing, the crux of the issue is overfishing in and of itself, and how it breaches UNCLOS 
obligations under Part V and Part XII. These obligations should outweigh those within the realm 
of the WTO, despite the exclusive mention of subsidies there. Ultimately, UNCLOS should 
provide jurisdiction ratione materiae as the more specific treaty regarding the environment. 
 
5.2 Responsibility for Overfishing Within the EEZ 
 
 “Responsibility” 164  for overexploitation of marine living resources within an EEZ 
depends on numerous factors. Firstly, one must determine if the coastal State overexploited the 
resource, or if it was a third-party/separate State. Secondly, it must be specified if there was a 
breach of coastal State or flag State obligations. As previously determined, Part V allocates 
exclusive jurisdiction for coastal States to manage marine living resources within 200nm. 
However, this jurisdiction is subject to the provisions under Part XII, relating to protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.  
Regarding the role of flag States whose vessels operate within the EEZ of other States, 
Wolfrum says, “[UNCLOS] says nothing explicitly on this subject.”165 Under UNCLOS Article 
58, “States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply 
with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State.”166 From the wording, this indicates a 
mandatory minimum, meaning, “flag States can therefore adopt, apply, and enforce stricter laws 
governing activities of fishing vessels flying their flag in the EEZ of other States.”167 Within Part 
V, these regulations are more specifically evinced under UNCLOS Article 62(4)(a-k). 
Importantly, this obligation also falls under the realm of Part XII in general scope and 
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application. Furthermore, Wolfrum states, “It may be argued that there is a mutual obligation to 
reinforce each other’s efforts to manage and conserve the marine environment.”168 
In addition to regulatory jurisdiction of the coastal State and flag State, Part V affords the 
coastal State with enforcement jurisdiction under UNCLOS Article 73. This article allows the 
coastal State to board, inspect, arrest and commence judicial proceedings as may be necessary.169 
Under Article 73(2), “Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the 
posting of reasonable bond or other security.”170 However, parallel jurisdiction exists consistent 
with UNCLOS Articles 58(2), 91 and 92 which affords the flag State jurisdiction over vessels in 
the high seas and EEZ, as well as “jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters,”171 in accordance with Article 94. One argument made in this light limited Article 94 to 
navigation and not to fisheries. 172  However, this notion was made clear to include the 
conservation and management of marine living resources by ITLOS in their Request for an 
Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC).173 
 One major advantage to coastal State enforcement jurisdiction is in regards to flags of 
convenience. Flags of convenience pose an additional threat for meaningful flag State governance 
worldwide. Essentially, “a flag of convenience is a legal identity for a ship […] registered easily 
for a fee in a jurisdiction where it is not ultimately owned.”174 These “open registries” often 
exercise very limited jurisdiction and enforcement. However, under Article 91(1) of UNCLOS 
there must exist a ‘genuine link’ between the ship and the State.175 When inside the EEZ of a 
coastal State, if the visiting vessel acts in a way contrary to the laws of the coastal State, the 
coastal State has the power to enforce its laws and regulations. Yet, the requirement for 
enforcement often relies on suitable vessels to board, inspect and ultimately arrest. For developed 
States such as those in the European Union, or China and Japan, enforcement capabilities are less 
of an issue. However, for countries such as those off of Western Africa, following the allocation 
of surpluses, enforcement for overfishing within their EEZ is a difficult issue to mitigate.   
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5.3 General Obligations 
 
The general obligation of States regarding the settlement of disputes is found under Part 
XV of UNCLOS. Article 279 obliges States to, “settle any dispute between them concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention by peaceful means.”176 Included in Part XV are 
procedures 177  and obligations 178  regarding peaceful means, conciliation, 179  compulsory 
procedures entailing bindings decisions (Section 2),180 as well as exceptions and limitations to the 
applicability of section 2181 and optional exceptions to the applicability of section 2.182 “The ICJ 
has indicated that the existence of a dispute is a matter to be determined objectively […] and the 
mere assertion (or denial) of its existence by a State concerned is insufficient.”183 
UNCLOS Article 59 is committed to the resolution of disputes regarding rights and 
jurisdiction in the EEZ by peaceful means. Conflicts shall be, “resolved on the basis of equity and 
in light of all the relevant circumstances […] with the interests involved to the parties as well as 
to the international community as a whole.”184 Consensual means should first be endeavoured to 
resolve a conflict, however, if that fails, “the dispute settlement provisions codified in Part XV 
ought to be activated.”185 Under Part XV, disputes may be heard either through ITLOS, the ICJ, 
or by an ad-hoc arbitral body.186 Pending the activation of a compulsory procedure entailing a 
binding decision, such a scenario could ultimately lead to the coastal State enacting Article 
297(3)(a) if the dispute in question concerned the sovereign rights over its EEZ fisheries. 
 
5.4 Exclusion Clause – Article 297(3)(a) 
 
Despite the prevalence of UNCLOS articles obliging conservation and cooperation with 
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respect to domestic fish stocks, a major obstacle for protection and preservation of the marine 
environment within 200nm is found under Section 3 of Part XV: Settlement of Disputes. Article 
297 outlines the Limitations on applicability of section 2. Distinctly, Article 297(3)(a) states, 
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to 
fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to 
accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the 
living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise […].187 
In examining the aforementioned article, one must first review the wording preceding the 
earliest comma. It has been noted, “[the] opening clause […] was a confirmation of jurisdiction, 
not a limitation of it. If the words were to have meaning, the remainder of the subparagraph, 
which is where the limitation was to be found, ‘must be narrower in scope than the […] first 
part.’”188 Jurisprudence and various scholarly texts appear steadfast in that Article 297(3)(a) 
protects the coastal State from mandatory binding dispute settlement procedures regarding its 
discretion over EEZ fisheries.189 If subsidies were to be implicitly read into the realm of 
UNCLOS, this exclusion may still apply if the issue was deemed a fisheries related issue. 
Although capacity enhancing fisheries subsidies often intensify State fisheries, the actual result of 
what the subsidies lead to may be where a potential dispute is established. 
 
5.5 Interpretation of Article 297(3)(a) 
 
Under Article 31(1) of the VCLT, “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning…and in the light of its object and purpose.”190 Herein lies a possible 
problem, as overexploitation should be viewed as an ‘abuse of rights’ and inconsistent with 
notions of ‘good faith’ as outlined under UNCLOS Article 300. One can make the argument that 
the original purpose and intention of UNCLOS was not to create a safeguard under Article 
297(3)(a) that would effectively protect coastal States to destroy fish stocks.191 This destruction 
																																																								
187 Ibid, art. 297(3)(a). 
188 Andrew Serdy. "Articles 297-299." In United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary, by 
Alexander Proelss (Ed.). Munich: C. H. Beck, 2017, p. 1917, para. 23. 
189 For further discussion, please see Churchill at: booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/ 
157180807781870336, specifically page 288 onwards. 
190 Supra note 14. 
191 This will be discussed further in the section below.	
	 35 
(largely) affects the greater marine ecosystem192 and is induced partially through fears of losing 
those stocks to other nations as well as a government-supported overcapacity of fisheries 
operations to do so.193 Sumaila describes this endeavour as the “race to fish.”194 Churchill and 
Lowe likens this competition to catch available fish as fueled by the over-capacity of the world’s 
fishing industries which, “puts pressure on fishery managers to increase TACs above the levels 
recommended by scientists and adopt less stringent conservation measures.”195 This competition 
effectively leads to fisherman disregarding conservation measures, which in turn only leads to 
further degradation of living marine resources.196  
Article 297(1)(c) outlines that in cases where, “a coastal State has acted in contravention 
[…of] standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,”197 compulsory 
procedures entailing binding decisions shall be undertaken. As this binding article precedes the 
fisheries exception in Section 3, there appears some justification regarding the true intention of 
the drafters of the article. However, this argument is not devoid of scrutiny as the exception in 
297(3)(a) remains explicit in its formulation.  
In Chagos, the United Kingdom (UK) submitted, “the object of [Article 297(3)]… is to 
keep coastal State fisheries disputes out of court as far as possible. That’s what coastal States 
wanted, particularly Developing States, when they asked for creation of the [EEZ].”198 Although 
this argument remains subject to discussion, it is clear that at the seventh session of the third 
conference of UNCLOS, Negotiating Group 5 was tasked with determining the settlement of EEZ 
disputes over fisheries.199 The group implemented to do so consisted of 36 States, of which 27200 
are presently regarded as developing countries.201 The Chairman of Negotiating Group 5, 
																																																								
192 One example to illustrate this point was the depletion of Cod fisheries off the east coast of Canada, which 
“fundamentally altered the food web and functioning of the ecosystem.” Please see: www.environmental science.org/ 
environmental-consequences-fishing-practices. 
193 Supra note 42 at p. 5. 
194 Rashid Sumaila. The race to fish: how fishing subsidies are emptying our oceans. The Conversation: October 18, 
2015. Online: theconversation.com/the-race-to-fish-how-fishing-subsidies-are-emptying-our-oceans-48227 
(Accessed June 23, 2018). 
195 Supra note 2. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Supra note 9 at art. 297(1)(c). 
198 Supra note 115 at para 246. 
199 James C. F. Wang. Handbook on Ocean Politics and Law. Westport: Greenwood, 1992, p. 477. 
200 "Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973-1982." A/CONF.62/63, Montego Bay, 22 March 
1978. Online: legal.un.org/docs/?path=../diplomaticconferences/1973_los/docs/english/vol_9/a_conf62_63. 
pdf&lang=E (Accessed July 1, 2018). 
201 "Country classification." World Economic Situation and Prospects. United Nations. 2014. Online: www.un.org/ 
en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf (Accessed July 1, 2018). 
	 36 
Constantine Stavropoulos, indicated that 34 of the 36 representatives pushed for the exclusion 
clause of Article 297(3), with conciliation emerging as a compromise.202 The fear, predominately 
among developing countries was that, “[they] felt that their sovereign rights and discretions could 
not be effectively exercised ‘if they were to be harassed by an abuse of […] applications to 
dispute settlement procedures.’”203 The great irony however is that industrialized countries with 
heavily subsidized fishing fleets have been predominately responsible for overfishing within their 
own EEZs,204 as well as others when paying for access rights to their surpluses.205  
This should be examined in light of Article 31(1) of the VCLT as Article 297(3) of 
UNCLOS was originally advocated from a developing-State perspective to protect their own 
resources as many developing nations lacked and continue to lack the capacity206 to domestically 
overfish.207 Therefore, the protection of Article 297(3) appears significantly more ‘useful’ for 
industrialized countries that have expanded their fishing efforts to such a degree, which almost 
certainly was unforeseen at the drafting stages of UNCLOS. In Chagos, the UK argued, “[In] 
advocating an evolutionary and environmental interpretation of Article 297 Mauritius invites you 
to overturn a clear policy preference of the negotiating States at [the Conference].”208 However, 
such an argument fails to acknowledge that exploitation and conservation can correlate. Given 
the circumstances of the case, perhaps the argument made by Mauritius was in fact evolutionary, 
so as to frame a marine protected area (MPA) dispute as concerning the protection of the marine 
environment, but so is UNCLOS in that light too. Alan Boyle stipulates, “[UNCLOS] was 
intended to be capable of further evolution through amendment, the incorporation by reference of 
other [GAIRAS], and the adoption of additional global and regional agreement and soft law.”209 
Ultimately, the Tribunal ruled against the UK’s prior argument as the UK had additionally 
focused on the protection of coral in their arguments, which demanded the decision go beyond 
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strictly a fisheries dispute.210 In light of these circumstances, an ecosystem approach was fittingly 
taken as the dispute predominately concerned an MPA. 
An additional point to illustrate why EEZ overfishing might run contrary to the original 
purpose and meaning of Article 297(3) is why else would Part V of UNCLOS create obligations 
under the term shall, if they effectively carried no legal ‘weight’? On the one hand, one must take 
into account that this was a natural result of the ‘package deal’ and compromises reached so that 
UNCLOS could actually be concluded and signed/ratified by all States. On the other hand, why 
even include it at all if it carries no legal weight? Although the legal obligation remains in full 
force under international law, the reality is that options are limited for compulsory dispute settle-
ment entailing binding decisions. For example, “Although the second sentence of [UNCLOS] 
Article 62[2] is phrased in mandatory terms, the coastal States’ obligation to open access for 
other states to the surplus can not be enforced.”211  In this light, what alternatives are left for third 
parties against coastal States for detrimental fishing practices in an effort to protect and preserve 
the marine ecosystem, while fish stocks remain at levels equitable and sustainable for all?  
 
5.6 Possible Article 297(3)(a) bypass option: Article 298(1)(b) 
 
Article 298(1)(b) might provide one avenue on which to address fisheries-related disputes 
in the EEZ within the mandatory dispute settlement fora. While prescriptive jurisdiction is 
excluded under Article 297(3)(a) of UNCLOS, enforcement jurisdiction under Article 298(1)(b) 
is not excluded. Prescriptive jurisdiction grants States with the power to regulate persons and 
things through the passage of laws. Enforcement jurisdiction grants States the power to enforce 
said laws within their territory. The University of Virginia’s Centre of Ocean Law and Policy’s 
Commentary on the LOSC argues, “Only disputes concerning the enforcement of provisions 
relating to […] fisheries, which are not subject to the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal because of 
the express exceptions in Article 297[3], can be excepted by a declaration under Article 298.”212 
Therefore, under Article 298(1)(b), the law enforcement activities in regards to fisheries may not 
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be excepted. Notwithstanding, such a scenario whereby a State might arrest or enforce against the 
coastal State for its own fishing practices remains highly unlikely and injudicious.  
Consistent with UNCLOS Article 298(1), a State may at any time declare in writing that it 
does not accept the category of dispute under Article 298(1)(b).213 Currently, nineteen States have 
written declarations excluding such a category, with a few other States excluding a distinct court 
or tribunal only. 214  “In contrast, disputes concerning enforcement activities in relation to 
environmental offences […] would not fall within the scope of this exclusion.”215 This notion is 
pertinent given Wolfrum’s earlier statement that, “It may be argued that there is a mutual 
obligation to reinforce each other’s efforts to manage and conserve the marine environment.”216 
 
5.7 Does Article 297(3)(a) extend so as to include biodiversity? 
 
In Chagos, one argument made by the UK specifically warrants some added attention 
regarding how far reaching the EEZ fisheries exclusion clause goes. In acknowledging ‘sovereign 
rights’ as written under Article 297(3)(a) with respect to living resources in the EEZ, the UK 
advocated for a rather broad scope so as to include “the protection of biodiversity [in the 
exception].”217 Such a point was subsequently challenged in Chagos as the ruling argued, “[the 
UK’s point is] not sustained by Arts. 61 and 62 of the [UNCLOS].”218 “The protection of the 
biodiversity does not come under the sovereign rights concerning the protection and management 
of living resources [under the EEZ regime]. It is a matter of the protection of the environment 
[under Part XII].”219 Where part of the arbitrators’ challenge falls short is that although the very 
notion of ‘sustainable development’ is omitted from original UNCLOS text, the notion has largely 
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been adopted through UNCLOS and its implementing agreements.220 Sustainable development is 
inextricably linked to the EEZ,221 and biodiversity should be read into UNCLOS Arts. 61 and 62, 
as well as a fundamental aspect of Part XII.  
In Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures), the Court stated, “The conservation of 
the living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.”222 This view does not entirely lineup with the arbitrators’ argument in Chagos, 
while not entirely following the counter-argument made by the UK either. If biodiversity is to be 
read into Arts. 61 and 62 of UNCLOS, that does not automatically afford it the exclusion as 
provided under Article 297(3)(a). The Section 3 limitation under Part XV of UNCLOS applies 
merely to fisheries as a harvestable resource, most commonly intended for food. 223 This 
statement is realized as there is no explicit reference to biodiversity in UNCLOS, and no mention 
of fisheries related terms such as MSY and TAC, found in the CBD. Fisheries are dependent on 
biodiversity and vice versa, and as Macdonald states, “Without biodiversity, there is no future for 
humanity.”224 Aspects of this sentiment are realized in the CBD and through the ecosystem 
approach. However, the findings of Chagos and Southern Bluefin Tuna conflict to some degree 
and ultimately, must be interpreted accordingly. The implications of such an interpretation can be 
far-reaching, yet it appears that the ruling in Southern Bluefin Tuna with respect to living marine 
resources has been the more widely accepted of the two (in this context) and the aforementioned 
quotation can be found extensively cited.225  
Chagos was decided in 2015 and UNCLOS was adopted 33 years prior. These dates 
indicate that UK’s previous point, so as to include biodiversity in Arts. 61 and 62, should be 
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deemed consistent with modern UNCLOS norms, jurisprudence and recent implementation 
agreements adopted to ‘fill any holes’ left in the original UNCLOS text. In that light, not only 
should the conservation and management of living resources be read alongside the protection of 
the environment, but also the protection of endangerment by overexploitation should go so far as 
to reflect biodiversity and marine habitats. This view is supported through Southern Bluefin Tuna 
and South China Sea.226 Furthermore, these notions subsequently reflect the modern ecosystem 
approach and are therefore supported through UNCLOS, the CBD and CITES (among others), but 
not under the exclusion clause of UNCLOS Article 297(3)(a), which pertains solely to the 




 Indeed, Article 297(3)(a) of UNCLOS provides a blanket protection from mandatory 
dispute settlement resulting in binding decisions regarding coastal State discretion for 
management over its fisheries. The wording and the intent of the provision should be read as 
‘black and white.’ However, “if a state has manifestly failed to avoid overexploitation or is 
refusing to set TACs, it could be forced into a compulsory conciliation.”227 Rothwell and 
Stephens note that the same applies, “where a coastal State has manifestly failed to adopt 
conservation and management measures to protect EEZ living resources.”228 Either party to a 
dispute may unilaterally bring a dispute before compulsory conciliation under Annex V, Section 
2, however, as Churchill notes, its “utility is perceived to be very limited as the report […] is 
non-binding.”229 In that light, if more meaningful change in a dispute is to be pursued, a different 
avenue may need to be taken. Nevertheless, Owen argues, “the possibility of scrutiny by a 
conciliation commission may be some incentive to a coastal State to, for example, avoid an 
allegation of manifest failure to adopt appropriate conservation and management measures.”230 
																																																								
226 Supra note 222 at para. 71, Supra note 113 at para. 1181(b). 
227 Solène Guggisberg. The Use of CITES for Commercially-exploited Fish Species: A Solution to Overexploitation 
and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing? Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs (Springer), 2015, p. 33. 
228 Supra note 52 at p. 327. 
229 Robin Churchill. “‘Compulsory’ Dispute Settlement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
– How has it operated? Pt. 1 ” UiO PluriCourts Blog, June 9, 2016. Online: www.jus.uio.no/ pluricourts/english/ 
blog/guests/2016-06-09-churchill-unclos-pt-1.html (Accessed August 4, 2018). 
230 Daniel Owen, In the Matter of the Rights and Obligations of Coastal States Under UNCLOS Regarding Fisheries 
Conservation and Management, August, 26, 2016, Online:	www.sff.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/03/Advice-26-




For a State to knowingly subsidize its fisheries to the point of overexploitation either 
within its own EEZ, or in the EEZ of another State, the effect is arguably a legal breach of its 
obligations under UNCLOS. Overexploitation should be read so as to violate both positive and 
negative environmental obligations under UNCLOS, as well as numerous other treaties, such as 
the CBD. However, the enforcement options depend on the maritime zone. If the overexploitation 
has occurred by the flag State in another EEZ, the coastal State maintains enforcement options 
under Part V, as well as Part XV options if the offence concerns the interpretation or application 
of UNCLOS. However, no State may enact a mandatory dispute settlement entailing a binding 
decision regarding the coastal State’s management over its own fisheries. This exception, 
although initially written in favour of developing States, today predominately protects developed 
States who have the capacity to harvest their own TAC and more, largely through subsidies. This 
could very well run contrary to the ordinary meaning of the exclusion, but such would be 
objectionable at best. There does exist a bypass option through “enforcement” under Article 
298(1)(b), but it appears as though a coastal State could initiate a written declaration immediately 
to nullify the option. Jensen and Bankes argue, “Articles 297 and 298 involve issues of important 
national interest.”231 This is true, however one could argue their interpretation is wrong as it fails 
to acknowledge a vested international interest as well as the ecosystem approach to fisheries, 
which encompasses the entire ecosystem. The inclusion of biodiversity into Article 297(3)(a) 
through case law unintentionally raises various options, which will be explored in the subsequent 
chapter. Perhaps in this new light, and through an evolutionary interpretation of UNCLOS, there 
might prevail an option to mitigate the protections of overfishing within the EEZ. 
 
Chapter 6: The Use of EIAs and the Ecosystem Approach 
 
Article 297(1)(c) stipulates that disputes related to the sovereign rights of a coastal State 
shall be subject to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions when, “it is alleged that a 
coastal State has acted in contravention of specified international rules and standards for the 
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protection and preservation of the marine environment […].”232 This begs the question of when a 
dispute relating to fisheries can be drawn under a logical legal conclusion as that primarily rooted 
in protection and preservation of the marine environment. One might first look to the preamble of 
UNCLOS as it is stipulated: “The problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be 
considered as a whole.”233 In this light, overexploitation could be interpreted as an issue for all 
States, as well as contrary to Part XII in a general sense. This sentiment is realized under the 
modern ecosystem approach, as living resources do not respect maritime zone boundary lines, 
whilst the interrelatedness and dependencies on all ocean species cannot be understated.  
 This chapter will review the question of whether the use of environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) and the modern ecosystem approach in a subsidies fisheries dispute can help 
frame the issue as a Part XII dispute, thus enabling it to fall under the UNCLOS compulsory 
dispute settlement regime, and effectively subject to legally binding scrutiny.  More specifically, 
breaches to the obligations of Article 192 and 193, as well as those found under Section 4, 
relating to monitoring and environmental assessment will be addressed. 
 A number of matters will first need to be visited in order to elaborate on this issue. First, 
the ecosystem approach, championed under the CBD will be interpreted so as to apply to the 
general obligations under Part XII as well as fisheries subsidies. The importance of this section is 
primarily rooted in strengthening a legal argument against overfishing and the subsidies that 
perpetuate it, while including a more modern approach to resource management. Furthermore, an 
ecosystem approach expands the scope of fisheries subsidies as their effects extend beyond 
simply fish. To illustrate, the effects of subsidizing fisheries can directly correlate with damage to 
the general ecosystem, as seen with the collapse of the Atlantic northwest cod fishery.  This is 
important as the limit of Article 192 may be through the interpretation of other agreements, thus 
enabling the applicability of the ecosystem approach under the CBD.  
Secondly, the principle of prevention will be briefly touched upon to guide the discussion 
into the realm of EIAs. EIAs most importantly demand the disclosure of information and the 
efforts of due diligence to be exercised. In order to fulfill this, fishery subsidy efforts by the State 
government may need to be characterized as a “project” to run congruently with case law, and fit 
the meaning of “activity” in order to fall under UNCLOS Article 206. Ultimately, States have an 
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obligation to conduct EIAs for activities that pose potential danger to the marine ecosystem, 
which corresponds with the negative obligations of due diligence as per UNCLOS Articles 192 
and 193. Failure to act in such a manner, and crossed with the findings of previous chapters, 
subsidizing a fishing fleet to cause overfishing should be seen as an issue to all and contrary to 
the fundamental legal obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.  
 
6.1 Reading the Ecosystem Approach into UNCLOS 
 
While interpreting ‘marine environment’ in the preceding text, ecosystem was included in 
many definitions, as well as in Article 194(5) of UNCLOS. If “ecosystem” is to be read under 
UNCLOS, could then the ecosystem approach of the CBD be read so as to fall under the Part XII 
positive/negative due diligence obligations? This interpretation could be deemed evolutionary so 
as to include a holistic approach to marine living resource management consistent with Part XII, 
which must be explored further.  
The ecosystem approach is the “primary framework for action under the [CBD],”234 and is 
described as, “a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living resources that 
promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way.”235 One importance of the CBD, 
according to Wolfrum and Matz is that in regards to the protection of marine living resources, 
unlike UNCLOS, the CBD “includes in its concept the potential needs of future generations as 
well as the recognition of an intrinsic value of biodiversity.”236 This argument is well founded as 
there is no mention of future generations in the UNCLOS preamble or elsewhere, and with the 
only mention read implicitly through the interpretation of “preserve.”  
“The ecosystem approach as applied vis-à-vis marine living resources means in general 
that biological and ecological interactions […] in [all] neighbouring jurisdiction zones, and the 
ecological conditions of the physical surroundings have to be reflected in the fishery policy.”237 
This notion appears to be more in line with the true essence238 of sustainability read into 
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UNCLOS, as opposed to some socio-economic factors that have driven (predominately) 
developed States to overexploit fisheries domestically under the guise of ‘exploitation rights.’ 239 
Regarding coastal States’ conservation and management measures, Young argues the 
CBD is a valuable tool for providing information on the interdependencies of stocks, fishing 
patterns and generally recommended international minimum standards.240 Under this explanation, 
actions by China in the South China Sea Arbitration could be read in line with the effects of 
Chinese fisheries subsidies effectively building up the capacity to an excessive fleet size, which 
in turn has caused overfishing241 as well as harmful fishing practices.242 The Tribunal noted: 
Where a State is aware that vessels flying its flag are engaged in […] inflicting significant damage on […] the 
habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species, its obligations under [UNCLOS] include a duty to 
adopt rules and measures to prevent such acts and to maintain a level of vigilance in enforcing those rules and 
measures.243 
Although this can be viewed as overstretching the intentions of the tribunal, specifically 
regarding harmful fishing practices such as the Chinese use of dynamite, their excessive fleet size 
is worthy of mention as the results are extensive overfishing. More importantly, this quote relates 
directly to the due diligence obligations that must be undertaken by States, while citing reference 
to the ecosystem approach through “habitat.”  
Article 194(5) of UNCLOS stipulates that measures taken in accordance with Part XII 
“shall include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the 
habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.”244 The 
South China Sea is one such area producing paltry fish stocks due to overfishing,245 and in the 
South China Sea Arbitration, the tribunal stated, “In addition to preventing the direct harvesting 
of species recognized internationally as being threatened with extinction, Article 192 extends to 
the prevention of harms that would affect depleted, threatened, or endangered species indirectly 
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through the destruction of their habitats.”246 In this light, it becomes clear that Article 192 
envisages a protection whereby harm to living resources such as fish (if harvested to a state of 
overexploitation) equal harm to habitats and biodiversity. Here we see the implicit reference and 
origin of the ecosystem approach within the UNCLOS text, as ruled in the South China Sea 
Arbitration. Guggisberg argues that the obligation of coastal States to “adopt and implement 
conservation measures to avoid overexploitation [… is the] first step towards an ecosystem 
approach.”247 However, one could make a case that even before that step, the principle of 
prevention must be followed. 
 
6.2 The Principle of Prevention 
 
 From the mid-twentieth century, the Trail Smelter Case established the principle of 
prevention in international environmental law. The case specifically dealt with a project, which 
caused transboundary pollution between Canada and the United States. The tribunal found: 
No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury […] in or to 
the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 248 
The facts of Trail Smelter surrounded “fumes” specifically in relation to transboundary 
injury. However, the decision by the tribunal was adopted through subsequent treaties, such as 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972 and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration 
addressing “damage to the environment” more broadly.  
Schatz notes, the principle of prevention creates a ““positive” obligation to take steps to 
prevent transboundary harm […and has been included] indirectly in Article 193 UNCLOS with 
respect to the marine environment [through Trail Smelter].”249 Citing Wolfrum, Schatz recites, 
“several statements submitted in ITLOS, Case No. 21 claim that the preventative principle 
applies to fishing in the EEZ.”250 This is further supported through the conclusions reached in 
Chapter 4, whereby environmental obligations supersede exploitation rights within the EEZ. In 
order to fulfill the obligations of the principle of prevention, States have a duty to conduct EIAs 
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for activities under UNCLOS as well as the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention).  
 
6.3 Environmental Impact Assessments 
 
 The importance of EIAs to assist in framing fisheries subsidies as a Part XII dispute is 
twofold. First, EIAs require the State to conduct research before any actions of their activity. In 
this case, that activity would be subsidizing their fisheries under the category of capacity 
enhancing/ambiguous (harmful). From this, due diligence would need to be completed to prove 
their actions will not harm the environment. Secondly, the State must publish the results of their 
research. In theory, other States should be granted access to those results. In this regard, two 
possible breaches could occur. Firstly, a breach in not conducting the research and/or providing 
the information, which would run subject to mandatory dispute settlement mechanisms under 
UNCLOS. Secondly, a breach could occur against the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment even after the publication of results is made. However, this breach would obviously 
indicate the State knowingly endangered the marine environment contrary to their Part XII 
obligations, or that they failed to enforce their own EEZ, ultimately ending with the same result; 
subject to mandatory dispute settlement under UNCLOS Article 297(1)(c).  
Although read into UNCLOS, Espoo Convention establishes the obligations of its 
signatories to conduct EIAs, as well as properly define the term. EIAs are defined as, “a national 
procedure for evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment.”251  
 
6.4 UNCLOS Article 206 
6.4.1 “Activities” 
 
Article 206 of UNCLOS outlines EIAs through the title, “Assessment of potential effects 
of activities.”252 It is first pertinent to determine if “activities” can be linked to the practice of 
fisheries endeavours, and the process of subsidizing fisheries. While “activities” is mentioned 
numerous times throughout UNCLOS, the closest thing to an appropriate definition can be found 
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under Article 1(1)(3). Although written in the context of the Area, Article 1(1)(3) explicitly 
defined activities as those linked to the exploration and exploitation of resources. This definition 
should suffice in application to fisheries and subsequent discussion will reveal pertinent 
jurisprudence supports this notion. 
Blitza argues, “[In] Southern Bluefin Tuna the ITLOS – in essence – held that an EIA 
needs to be conducted if there is some evidence of a risk of significant harm.”253 Boyle opines a 
similar statement through a ‘generous’ interpretation of paragraph 79 of Southern Bluefin Tuna. 
Paragraph 79 maintains there was “scientific uncertainty”254 regarding the stock and a divergence 
in opinions on conservation measures. Yet, it must be understood that both parties agreed, “the 
stock of southern bluefin tuna is severely depleted and is at its historically lowest levels and that 
this is a cause for serious biological concern.”255 Despite the agreement, Japanese intentions to 
increase fishing efforts could easily be argued as proposing a risk of significant harm. 
 Boyle and Blitza interpreted the effect of the provisional measures order in Southern 
Bluefin Tuna requiring, “further studies of the state of the stock,”256 as consistent with the 
requirements of an EIA. Under the Espoo Convention, the requirement of “national procedure”257 
for EIAs arguably cannot be fulfilled in Southern Bluefin Tuna, as the case involved trilateral 
efforts and an RFMO dealing with fishing endeavours, primarily in the high seas, where national 
legislation lacks binding quality on third States. However, it would appear that the second 
requirement under the Espoo Convention of “evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity 
on the environment,”258 arguably can be seen as fulfilled within the context of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna as, “the effect of [ITLOS’] order was that catch quotas could only be increased by 
agreement after further studies of the state of the stock.”259    
 Therefore, in determining the applicability of fisheries endeavours to an EIA, the first 
hurdle to overcome was defining activities. Article 206 mentions “planned activities,”260 yet 
makes no efforts to define what that specifically entails. The general definition found in Article 1 
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provides some assistance in outlining ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ as components of the term, 
but does not make an explicit link to fishery endeavours as its context is rooted in the ‘Area’. 
Meanwhile, the interpretation by Boyle and Blitza, based on the outcome in Southern Bluefin 
Tuna, links fisheries to “activities” through the interpretation of para. 79, and the effect of the 
provisional measures on the subsequent endeavours of the parties concerned for failing to 
conduct an EIA.  
One additional point to illustrate this issue is that although not explicitly defined in The 
Case Concerning Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, the term “project” was used interchangeably 
with the term “activity,”261 which is conducive to EIAs. As the ICJ judgment in Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros illustrated, “[the] need to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.”262 The connection 
between fisheries and sustainable development is well documented and promoted, specifically 
through the FAO including its implementing agreements, such as the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries. Under the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, one of its main 
objectives is to “facilitate and promote technical, financial and other cooperation in conservation 
of fisheries resources and fisheries management and development.”263 
 
6.4.2 “…or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment” 
 
The ‘middle section’ of the text found in Article 206 of UNCLOS calls for an EIA when 
planned activities pose a serious risk of, “pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the 
marine environment.”264 The first question to determine is the applicability of Article 206 beyond 
a strict interpretation that might solely encompass pollution. Article 206 is part of Part XII, which 
aims to encompass protection and preservation of the marine environment completely. However, 
the location of Article 206 directly preceding the six articles that address pollution specifically 
may be noteworthy. Furthermore, the full title of the Espoo Convention, where EIAs are defined, 
relates EIAs in a transboundary context, which also links directly to pollution.  
During the Geneva Conventions it appeared that many States likened Article 206 to relate 
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specifically to pollution,265 however, UNCLOS ultimately proved to be a political compromise.266 
In that light, the placement of “or” in a literal reading should be read so as to extend beyond 
pollution specifically. Herein lies an important determination, as was previously noted, Southern 
Bluefin Tuna linked living resources (fisheries) as a component of the marine environment.267 
Therefore, it should be concluded that fisheries activities fulfill the first two requirements of 
interpreting UNCLOS Article 206, as they would fall under “or significant changes to the marine 
environment.”268    
 
6.4.3 “Assess the potential effects” 
 
The assessment of potential effects is a fundamental component of UNCLOS, in relation 
to marine resources.269 Often, marine resources extend beyond the borders of one State’s 
maritime zones into another’s, or into the high seas. Article 61, which outlines the conservation 
of living resources, is one such article that calls for the “best scientific data available”270 to assist 
in determining the appropriate management measures to avoid mismanagement and promote 
sustainable conservation. The assessment of potential effects of activities under Art. 206 follows 
suit of Art. 61 in a similar fashion, and even requires States to share their reports. Yet, Art. 206 
goes even further as it exists as, “an enforceable obligation.”271 The obligation, however, left by 
the wording of Art. 206 remains vague and as per the Case Concerning Land Reclamation in and 
around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), breaches will likely only occur when no EIA 
has been conducted,272 or when an EIA has been deemed unsatisfactory.273  
 Section 4, Part XII of UNCLOS maintains that environmental assessments shall be 
consistent with “recognized scientific methods” 274  and “competent international 
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organizations.”275 Blitza describes competent international organizations as those, “international 
organizations with respective expertise and the capability to actually engage in research in the 
field.”276 In the field of fisheries, UNCLOS lists the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) as the competent expert.277  
 The FAO conducts and publishes a comprehensive list to include capture and global 
production under a global database and an annual yearbook.278 Furthermore, FAO is responsible 
for establishing ‘soft-law’ instruments, such as the Compliance Agreement, and publishes fact 
sheets including the FAO Major Fishing Areas, ASFIS List of Species for Fishery Statistics 
Purposes, and the CWP Handbook of Fisheries.279 With a wealth of knowledge, science and 
statistics available at the disposal of States involved in subsidizing fisheries endeavours, the 
results of an adequate EIA, if followed correctly and according to the findings, should not result 
in the furtherance of unsustainable fishing practices in areas, or on stocks, that are in need of 
restoration. Anything less could be deemed contrary to general obligations to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.  
 
6.4.4 “Communicate reports of the results” 
 
The final aim of UNCLOS Article 206 is to provide all States with the information 
collected by an EIA. Explicit reference is made to Art. 205 in this regard. The wording of “shall” 
creates an obligation for the coastal State, however the use of “should” does not create a strict 
obligation for international organizations, which receive the information first, to disseminate the 
information. “If a State publishes [the] results itself, it ensures that other States are able to access 
this information.”280  However, UNCLOS does “not impost direct obligations on international 
organizations.”281 The reasoning for an international organization not to reveal the findings of a 
coastal State would be perplexing, however it is unclear whether this effort could be viewed as 
contrary to Art. 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis.  
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A question then remains as to the applicability of Arts. 197, 205-06 on the disclosure of 
subsidies information by coastal States. As was previously argued, fisheries subsidies endeavours 
should fall under the designation of activities for the purposes of UNCLOS. Furthermore, a direct 
link was made between “projects” and “activities” in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros.282 One could make 
the argument that “planned activities under their jurisdiction”283 encompass fisheries subsidies 
undertakings and the disclosure and publication of information falls under the direct obligation of 
conducting and publishing EIAs. However, Churchill and Lowe argue, “[the vagueness of] 
coastal State’s fishery management duties set out in [UNCLOS] articles 61 and 62 […] mean that 
it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether any particular case the duties had 
been observed.” 284  EIAs for subsidies activities/projects would demand the disclosure of 
scientifically supported data on domestic fish stocks be made public. Such an argument would 
ultimately compel a coastal State to oblige the first step of the ‘four-point plan’ for UNDG target 
14.6, which encourages States to, “provide information on the subsidies they are providing to 
their fisheries sector.”285 The UNDGs ultimately remain a soft-law instrument with non-binding 
obligations, however a hard-law obligation to disclose information on subsidies projects in the 
form of EIAs could compel greater involvement from major fishing States.  
 
 6.5 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, based on observations previously stated and compiled with the findings of 
previous chapters, there is a case to be made to characterize a fisheries dispute as a Part XII 
dispute, with subsidies at the root of the issue. Specifically, the positive and negative obligations 
of UNCLOS Article 192 and 193, coupled with the obligation to conduct EIAs and disclose 
information on the state of stocks and the specifics of the activity (subsidies). Based on 
comprehensive research from the Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Chen concludes, “The environmental impact of fisheries subsidies can be large enough 
to cause damage to the whole ecosystem and biodiversity.”286 What Chen fails to state is that 
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fisheries subsidies are large enough now, and yet they are still increasing in size.287 Jurisprudence 
such as the South China Sea Arbitration has shown the applicability of the ecosystem approach 
with UNCLOS. Science has proven the interdependencies of species, 288 biodiversity and marine 
habitats, and as displayed in Canada after the collapse of the cod fishery, the results of 
overfishing can be “irreversible.”289 This poses an issue for all States who share the oceans and 
harvest resources that are inextricably linked to one another and demand each other to thrive.  
 Through reference to more specific treaties, the use of ecosystem and the ecosystem 
approach espoused under the CBD may be applied to shed light on what UNCLOS Article 192 
obligations entail and how wide the scope is. Monitoring and environmental assessment through 
Section 4, Part XII of UNCLOS may be seen to more specifically correspond to subsidizing 
efforts through “activities” and interchangeably through “projects,” which might be necessary for 
supporting jurisprudence if a case were to be brought forward. In this light, Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros is important to show how the court interpreted EIAs and the obligation they impose 
on all States before an activity. If a government-subsidizing program is deemed an 
“activity/project” they would be compelled to do research on the effects of their subsidies and 
disclose information on the current state of the fish stocks their activities wished to exploit. From 
this, if overexploitation were to arise, their previous EIA would reveal either they knowingly 
overfished an area, or were negligent in their enforcement. Both of these could then fall under 
Part XII obligations and would entail mandatory dispute settlement from a third State and as 
previously argued, is afforded that right as Part XII obligations could be deemed erga omnes. 
 
Chapter 7: Interaction with WTO Law 
 
Ultimately, the objective of this thesis hinges on substantiating a subsidies dispute 
through UNCLOS, outside of the scope of the WTO. Although the subsidies regime within the 
WTO may provide a valuable tool to incite meaningful change, UNCLOS provides another 
avenue, and change is the objective in addressing the issue of overfishing and subsidies.  
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Much like UNCLOS, WTO law possesses its own compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanisms and there is much debate on how the two regimes may interact when a dispute 
applies to both. The ILC regards this issue as the “fragmentation of international law,”290 which 
can lead to “forum shopping.”291 Furthermore, the problem of having the same subject under 
simultaneous dispute settlement forums can lead to infringement proceedings over the more 
applicable forum. This was one issue in MOX Plant with the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
ITLOS, and the Annex VII tribunal, where the ECJ ultimately prevailed. Lamy notes, “Short of 
any agreement between the parties and in the absence of any international rule as to how these 
two different mechanisms should interact, many scenarios may emerge.”292 These questions were 
hinted at in Shrimp-Turtle, and the EC-Swordfish dispute was likely to yield results, if it had gone 
to trial. Had it actually proceeded, Lamy claims, “If both processes were triggered at the same 
time, it is quite probable that the WTO panel process would proceed much faster than any other 
process.”293 This does not necessarily mean that WTO would prevail regarding regime interplay, 
only that ITLOS would take longer to hear the case and inevitably yield a finding. It is important 
to raise the issue regarding the principle of lex specialis, which entails, “a more specific treaty 
will usually trump the general treaty.”294 However, as previously argued, an issue of overfishing 
must be framed as one primarily rooted in protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
fisheries subsidies act as a causation for overfishing, which inevitably breaches UNCLOS Part 
XII. 
Despite the unknown question of regime interaction, under WTO law, the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) does not appear to strongly function in 
accordance with the objective of this dissertation, having only one reference to the environment. 
However, Article 25(2) of the ASCM requires members to submit and notify the WTO of the 
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subsidies they provide.295 This would appear to coincide with the UNCLOS requirement to 
disseminate information prior to undertaking activities, as per Article 206; EIAs. 
 While these comments barely scratch the surface of regime interplay and ASCM 
provisions regarding the submission of information, it does illustrate that environmental 
provisions are more important in regards to UNCLOS. In this light, Neumayer argues, “the WTO 
has done little to promote environmental protection so far and there is little hope that this is likely 
to change in the future.”296 This notion and the title of Neumayer’s article indicate that one of the 
biggest criticisms to the WTO is that it seems that trade always trumps environmental concerns. 
However, whether a WTO panel would even be well suited enough to determine environmental 
law provisions remains to be seen. For now, it appears there is an opportunity for fisheries 
subsidies-related disputes to be heard before a UNCLOS dispute settlement body as a dispute 
primarily rooted in environmental protection and preservation concerns, until proven otherwise. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 The objective of this thesis was to determine whether UNCLOS could provide a means to 
mitigate overfishing. More specifically, whether subsidies to fisheries leading to EEZ overfishing 
can be effectively addressed within the current UNCLOS legal regime. Data implicitly provides 
three important statistics which reveal the significance of what I was attempting to achieve. 1.) 
More than $35 billion is annually governmentally subsidized worldwide enabling fisheries to 
harmful capacity-enhancement.297 2.) 90% of all fishing occurs within the EEZ.298 3.) Scientists 
suggest in 30 years all worldwide fisheries will collapse.299 This issue is extremely important, and 
why it has not been addressed beyond the scope of WTO law was my question and inspiration for 
enquiry. 
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 The first hurdle to overcome was determining the causal link between general subsidies, 
fisheries subsidies and overfishing. While there is some debate as to the answer, there is 
irrefutable evidence that there is a link between fisheries subsidies and overcapacity, and that 
overcapacity leads to overfishing. 
 After limiting the scope of application to the EEZ, it was determined that flag State 
overfishing and coastal State overfishing are two very different issues, usually occurring in very 
different areas around the world. Flag State overfishing through overcapacity caused by subsidies 
is a major issue presently off of West Africa, among others. However, enforcement and lack 
thereof is one of the primary hurdles to overcome here, whereas overfishing by the coastal State, 
in their own EEZ leads to a whole other issue. 
 Within a coastal State’s EEZ, discretion over fisheries is heavily protected through the 
exclusion clause of Article 297(3)(a). However, if framed in a different light, overfishing should 
be deemed a Part XII issue as it runs contrary to the fundamental obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment. Chapter 4 found that this obligation supersedes exploitation 
sovereign rights and arguably falls under the erga omnes obligation that is owed to all States.
 While framing fisheries subsidies as contrary to Part XII, it was determined that while not 
directly fishing, governments that promote overfishing through their subsidies would facilitate an 
activity, and therefore fall within the realm of EIAs. This obligation would demand governments 
conduct adequate research and release the results publically. Both of which are issues that plague 
organizations such as the FAO from compiling more thorough research. Furthermore, if research 
revealed fisheries are already overexploited, the State would effectively be compromising itself if 
stocks deteriorated further. 
 Effectively reading the ecosystem approach into the equation reveals that the oceans are a 
shared resource, which extends beyond the premise of the maritime boundaries. Negative results 
in one area can affect those of other States and this relationship must be recognized if adequate 
results are to prevail. The oceans demand change now and while the WTO provides one avenue 
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